CRITICAL NATURE: COVID-19, Health Borders, and the Purity of the Thai Nation

by Jiraporn Laocharoenwong*

[Thai version available here]

Temperature Check at Myanmar/Thai Border (c) Thant Zin Aung / Myanmar Work in Thailand

Even though Thailand was the first country outside of China to record COVID-19 infections, the country has been successful in controlling the disease. Infections reached a peak of about 100-150 per day in March 2020, but dwindled to zero cases in May and has remained there since, with totals of around 3,500 infections and 59 deaths since the start of the pandemic. The EU consequently announced Thailand as no longer a dangerous zone. This makes one wonder how the Thai state is able to control/manage the pandemic.

This article examines the ad-hoc policy and regulation applied by the Thai government in controlling the spread of COVID-19 in the country. Based on document and fieldwork research, it reveals that in order to control spreading of the virus (both from outside and inside the country), the Thai government erected a ‘health border’ to control mobility of the people, as well as set up a governing body, the Center for Resolution for Emergency Resolution COVID-19 under the emergency decree. What is needed to pass this ‘health border’ is a Fit-to-Fly certificate, TM.08 form, health certificate indicating COVID-19 negative test, 14 days state-quarantine for people who return from abroad, while domestic regulation for the Thai people inside the country has involved lockdown and prohibition of interprovincial mobility, which also requires a health certificate and official permission to travel between provinces.  

Paradoxically, at the beginning of the crisis, almost all governments around the world recalled their citizens to return to their motherland, but the Thai government actually blocked their citizens to return home, which led many Thai overseas students to be stuck in transitory countries for several days. It was only later that the Thai government announced this ‘health border’, also requiring Thai citizens to complete a health check before returning (the one who is not fit cannot fly).

Instead of seeing and treating the Thai people as citizens that the state needs to protect, the Thai government categorizes people into two boxes: the infectious and the pure body. I draw my analysis upon a concept of Douglas on Purity and Danger (Douglas, 1966). The establishment of a health border and regulation does not only control the spreading of the virus, it suggests that the ultimate concern of the Thai government is reaching and maintaining zero cases and the purity of its nation. Moreover, the Thai overseas migrants returning from abroad and migrant workers are seen as ‘contaminated  bodies’, considered to be dangerous, and become a subject of control and purification. They have to be in a state or an alternative state quarantine without leaving the hotel room for 14 days before they are fully welcomed back home. This is like a rite de passage where a body has to pass through a purification process in order to be accepted back into the Thai society, similar to the idea of putting a criminal in prison in the hope that prison can convert bad people to be good. During this liminal period, the body is not treated fully as a citizen, but similar to a prisoner.

Health Borders: Temperature check in Mae Sot Border (c) Raweeporn Dokmai

Health Borders

The Thai government’s response to COVID-19 shares similarities with other countries around the world. State, border and health expertise play a strong role during this crisis involving the death and lives of the people, which scholars have analyzed as ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005). During the COVID-19 emergency crisis, especially, there was nothing more important than ‘health’ or ‘bio-security’, which leads to withdrawal of rights and privacy of the citizen (Agamben, 2020). In such a state of exception, the sovereign (the state) has the power to decide which persons' lives are worth saving and which ones are not. However, what COVID-19 policies effectively did to Thai overseas migrants and migrants from neighboring countries is to blur the boundary of ‘citizen’ and ‘other’. Under the name of health and bio-security, everybody is treated as potentially dangerous, simply a body subject to the state of exception where everyone, citizen or non-citizen, needs to pass through a newly erected health border (in addition to the geographical and political border) in order to screen the health of the body before entering into the Kingdom.

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, international travel required a valid passport and visa to cross the national border. Some countries ask you to fill in the form of declaration that you do not bring any prohibited goods or food to their lands, but during the pandemic, the Thai state requires you to declare your healthiness through fit-to fly, COVID-19 test 72 hour in advance, a TM 08 form, and then a mandatory quarantine. It is like crossing double borders, where the health border has even more stringent requirements than the political one.

Unlike common situations in the Southeast Asia region where (land) borders are often porous and permeable (van Schendel and de Maaker, 2014), COVID-19 caused the Thai government to shut all of the immigration/emigration points, and to seal the entire national border, which is around 5,656 km long. This phenomenon has never happened before. The sealed border was a necessary requirement to declare the state of emergency for health reasons, with the goal of reaching zero cases of infections.

The health border for the Thai citizen specifically comprised:

• Fit to Fly/Fit to Travel  certificate, issued by a doctor

• Health certificate indicating COVID-19 negative test

• TM.08 form, application for re-entry permit to return into the Thai Kingdom

• Declaration form for 14 days state quarantine

In order to return to Thailand, the Thai overseas returnees need to contact the Thai embassies at the countries where they stay. They need to follow all the procedures and complete all documents. Everything needed to be organized through the Thai embassies locally including arranging for your (repatriation) flight; it is not possible to book your own flight. Upon return, you will be transported to the allocated hotel that you will stay for another 14 days. However, the Thai overseas migrants are not homogenous. They are students, civil servants, tourists, foreign partners, (undocumented) migrant workers. Not all of them are able to get these documents due to difficult procedures, lacking a legal document, or having other difficulties.

Thai migrant workers from Malaysia express that it was difficult to get the Fit-to-Travel certification (they travel by land), especially for those who cannot speak Malay and English. Some of them indicate that in order to get all these documents, they need to travel from their workplaces, which are close to the Thai border, to Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia. It costs them a lot of money and time. Many of them decide to illegally cross the border back to Thailand. Moreover, the border has been sealed and the Thai government only allows for 100 returnees per day. Some of them have to wait for more than a week to go back to Thailand.  In the health border, citizenship almost carries no weight, it is all about bio-security and zero cases infection. Fassin emphasizes that it is “the tenets of bio-power to make live becomes a matter of choice over who shall live and what sort of life and how long”. Additionaly, life under bio-power is inequality (Fassin, 2009:53). The case of Thai migrant workers from Malaysia clearly show that under this health border, their return is deferred by the Thai state. Their lives might not be important while their bodies are subject of control with demanding to sacrifice for maintain and controlling the virus.

Purity of the Thai (national) body

Taweesin Visanuyothin, giving brief summaries of COVID-19 situation at Center of COVID-19 Situation Administration (CCSA), Government House of Thailand on April 2, 2020 (c) National Broadcasting Services of Thailand

“Since May 3, the number of new COVID-19 cases reported daily had been in single figures, except for 18 found among quarantined migrants in Songkhla province on May 4”, said Dr. Taweesilp Visanuyothin[1].

The quote clearly shows that Thailand is for the first time free from COVID-19[2] and the body of the Thai nation was cleansed, or purified. The exception in the quote was telling: the migrants who returned from Malaysia and stayed in state quarantine were not considered part of the Thai 'national body', nor did they count as Thai since they were migrants, whose bodies are suspect, having a potential to be infectious. This will contaminate the purity of the Thai national body.

Dr. Taweesilp spoke further:

 "We can relax, but cannot be reckless... Please keep to the new-normal practices. Finally, we may be among the first countries able to end the hardship brought by this disease".

This quote reveals that what the Thai state wants is to claim the credit and recognition from the international community that Thailand is able to deal with this disease and being among the first COVID-19-free countries. However, in order to keep the country free from COVID-19 (which is actually almost impossible to do so) it requires many sacrifices. Apart from the sacrifice of hard-working medical staff, the imposition of lock down measurements obliges people to stay at home. This leads to jobs losses in sectors that depend on people going out, people not able to feed their families, and despair because savings are low and there are debts to pay. The Mental Health Department reports that there are 2551 Thai people committed suicide in early this year. The rate increased by 22 percent compared to last year. The research study from Thai scholar team discloses that among 38 cases that they interviewed attempted to commit suicide were due to lock down, business closure, job losses, and furloughs. Among those 38 cases, there are 28 resulted in death[3].     

The idea of ‘purity body’ of the nation also explicitly resulted in xenophobia and racism for the case of Thai migrants returning from South Korea. The Thai migrant workers, informally called ‘Phee Noi ’ or little ghost since they illegally and discretely stay and work in South Korea, were the first group of Thai migrants who returned. It raised a hot debate in Thai society when social media showed that a female migrant did not do the self-quarantine when she arrived in her hometown in Chiangrai, visiting a restaurant and went shopping. From her case, the Thai society started to pinpoint and blame the return migrants as lacking responsibility to Thai society (as they were also irresponsible for their illegal stay in South Korea which affected other Thai tourists) and that they would be a super spreader, all in spite of the fact that they were treated quite badly by the Thai government. It later turned out that the big spreader of the virus in Thailand is not from them, but the group of upper middle class and Thai celebrities visited the boxing stadium.  

Moreover, the idea of purity penetrates into the provincial level and into individuals' minds. Trang is one of a few provinces that is COVID-19 free according to the report from the Centre for Resolution of Emergency Situation. My friend, a Thai overseas student who returned from the United Kingdom just before the Thai government announced the closing of the border had done his self-quarantine for 14 days in his house in Trang province. During the waiting time, he told me that he worried that he might get an infection and spread disease to his parents, but what made him more anxious is that he would then be the first infection case in Trang province. His name would be announced and put a shame on him. One does not want to be the dangerous body to bring impurity to the land. It similarly reflects what the Thai government thinks of when dealing with COVID-19 being about ‘purity of the Thai national body’.

Temperature Check at Mae Sot Border (Thai side) (c) Raweeporn Dokmai

Migrants, returnees, body politics and liminality

During the unstable time of COVID-19, both the bodies of Thai overseas and other migrants were considered to be dangerous. Regardless of their nationality, whether they are Thai or non-Thai, they must be in quarantine before getting back to live in society. However, migrant workers from neighboring countries are already seen as ‘other’ and not being included in the Thai society. Although they are physically in Thailand, they are generally excluded with no access to full rights as a Thai citizen. COVID-19 affects the body of Thai and other migrants in different and similar ways as  I show in the following:

i. Suspect body and rite de passage

As I illustrated above Thai overseas migrants were required to submit so many documents before returning to Thailand. After arrival, everybody needs to be in a state quarantine for 14 days. Their body is considered to be dangerous as they might carry the virus, therefore they need to be in an isolated place. This is like a rite de passage where they are in liminal stage and they can only be accepted back into society after their bodies are confirmed to be free from the virus. Moreover, the regulation blurs a boundary between being citizen and being migrant (other) by reducing it to be a suspect body. In other words, COVID-19 has temporarily removed rights of the citizen to become bare life (Agamben, 2005). By labelling all bodies coming from abroad as dangerous bodies, the bare body, irrespective of being a Thai citizen or a migrant, becomes a threat to national health security of the whole society. It is this way how the state of exception is operated.

However, the body of Burmese migrant workers, which is considered dangerous, at the same time contains some power. According to Douglas (1966), the body that is in a liminal stage, such as an unborn child in a woman's womb, is powerful since a child which does not yet become a human is a liminal subject whereby the child may inflict the death of the bearer. In the case of the migrant body, they might or might not carry the virus, so their status is unclear. Therefore, their body is dangerous to Thailand in general as they can spread the virus to the Thai citizen. In Singapore, migrant workers community were forgotten by the government and this led to a wide spread of the virus. This worries the Thai government since they want to keep Thailand out of a second wave. So, while migrant workers were spotted on and became subject of control, they also received the same medical treatment as the Thai people for a short time, because of the danger (and thereby power) that they wielded. At the same time, Thai overseas migrants experienced the feeling of their citizenship being partially removed when they crossed the health border. COVID-19 and the Thai government made them go through a short-time liminality period, for a moment sharing the same experience as migrant workers from neighboring countries. 

ii. Double liminality  

In mid-March, the Thai government announced a lock-down and sealing off of the border. It was the same time that the number of infection cases skyrocketed. For many migrant workers from Burma, it also happened to be their time to renew/extend their working permit, and this process cannot be done in Bangkok. Each of them needs to return to Myanmar. So they usually combine this renewal working permit with Songkran holidays, so they can spend some time at their hometown. However, due to the lockdown, many of them lost their jobs. Even the groups who were not (yet) unemployed had a real fear of an uncertain future and that one day soon they might be laid off as well. This led them to doubt whether they should return home to Myanmar, wait for the situation to improve and renew their visa, or that they should continue to stay in Thailand.

Of the group which decided to return, many got stuck at the Thailand-Myanmar border, because the borders were closed. It took several days before the Thai and Burmese government had an agreement to temporarily open the border for these groups of migrant workers to return. At that time, the Burmese government discouraged their own citizens to return home as well. The groups of returnees needed to self-quarantine for 16 days, as mandated by the Burmese government. A while later, some returnees wanted to return to the Thai side when they heard from their networks that the Thai factories were re-opened after a 3-month close. But the border was still closed for humans to cross, only open for commodity trading. Many of them decided to return by illegally crossing the border, upon which some were taken by the Thai border police and sent back to the Myanmar side.

There was also a time when the local government was flexible to open the border for migrants to cross back, however, they were required to have all obligatory documents as I mentioned above to pass the health border. At the border on the Thai side, the office checked migrants’ body temperature. There was a case that the Shan migrant passed the immigration control from Myanmar side then cross to Thai side, but his body’s temperature exceed 37.5 degrees Celsius. The Thai office sent him back, but the Burmese government did not want to take him back either.  Another case was reported by the local activist in Mae Sot about Muslim female migrants returned during the early time of the closed border. She was able to go back to Myanmar, but the Burmese state put them in a quarantine for 16 days at the border. When she arrived at her house, villagers were unhappy and afraid that she may spread the virus to them and their family members. She was required to stay inside her house for an additional 14 days. Later on, when she came back to Thai side, the migrant community in Mae Sot also required her to quarantine for 14 days and she relied on the food from her sister who visit her two times a day. This clearly show that during COVID-19 outbreak and relaxing phase, migrant workers who are already in a liminal position fall into another liminality with uncertainty when it will it end. Their lives are like being in double/layered liminality, one is from their status in the Thai society, and other is affected by COVID-19 which creates another layer of liminality to them.

iii. More difficulties

There is another group of migrant workers who decided not to return since they did not lose their job or their employer did not allow them to return.  This group may not face a double/layered of liminality, but they have to cope with difficulties on everyday life level while staying during this time.

Tee Tee works as a housekeeper in a suburb of Bangkok. She said that although COVID-19 did not make her lose her job, during lock-down she had to work longer hours and harder than before since her employer’s family members stayed at home. Apart from routine work, they demanded more services, so she had quite less time to relax. She said it was okay and better than losing her job. Similar to the case of Htoo Moo that works as a shop assistant in a center of Bangkok, she could not return to Myanmar since the employer did not want to take risk as she might not be able to return to Thailand again. She shared with me that she missed her family, especially her 2-year old son who she brought back to Myanmar last year and asked her parents to take care of him. She looked forward to seeing and hugging him again during the Thingyan, the Burmese New Year Festival. But it was impossible because of COVID-19. For her, Thingyan is not only just holidays, but a valuable time being at home in her house, relaxing, meeting friends and relatives, participating in religion ceremony, as well as taking care of official business, such as renewing her working permit.  

Win, a Lahu-Burmese man, works in an orchid farm in Nakorn Pathom. He shared with me that before COVID-19, he and his colleagues had to work every day. But during the lockdown, the orders from abroad stopped. His employer stopped cultivating orchids and laid off half the number of workers. He himself was not unemployed since he had been working with this employer for almost 8 years. But, he did not get paid his salary. The employer allowed him to stay in a worker house. He stopped sending remittances home for more than three months. His wife called and asked him when he could send her some money, his children have to eat every day. He wanted to find a part-time job in order to get some income, but it was impossible during this time. This made him stressed and he felt despair.

Tachileik, Myanmar / Mae Sai, Thailand: The time zone watches in the customs office ot the Myanmar-Thai Border. (c) CEphoto, Uwe Aranas

Conclusion

As we can see, COVID-19 outbreak affects migrant bodies in different and similar ways as Thai citizens. For the Burmese migrant workers, their body is necessary for the Thai economy as a body of labor, but not for something else. In a sense, it is a body that is disposable: if they go back, another migrant can take his/her place. In this sense, they are the quintessential 'other' to the Thai state (and many of its citizens who employ these migrants).

While COVID-19 exacerbated this focus on 'the body' by establishing a state of exception and erecting a strict health border in addition to the regular (political/geographical) border, returning Thai citizens suddenly found themselves subjected to a similar objectification, because their bodies as potential carriers of the virus were subject to the same health regime, which required anyone, citizen or non-citizen, to undergo several checks and enter into a liminal phase before being accepted back into Thai society. I showed in this article that the ultimate goal for Thai society hereby was purification of society, cleansing it of all virus elements, even getting international recognition for its successful response, yet irrespective of its own citizens left stranded abroad, a tanking economy, people losing their jobs, and increasing suicides nationally. Even after months of zero new cases, polls show widespread support in the population to keep the state of emergency going and maintain zero cases at all costs, which shows that the discourse of the purity of the Thai nation runs deep and is widespread (not only in the government). Even though Thai health authorities seem well-equipped to deal with a few cases if regulations would relax, it is still unclear when the state of emergency will be lifted.

—--

 * Commitee Member, Center of Excellence in Resource Politics for Social Development, Center for Social Development Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University

[1] Dr. Taweesilp Visanuyothin is the spokesperson of Centre for Resolution of Emergency Situation-COVID-19. The quote is from Bangkok Post. (13th May 2020). No new Covid-cases for the first time retrieved from https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/1917380/no-new-covid-cases-for-the-first-time (last access on 1 October 2020)

[2] In Thailand everyone diagnosed with COVID-19 gets transported to the hospital and is put in quarantine.

[3] อรรถจักร์ สัตยานุรักษ์ และคณะ (2020) โครงการวิจัย คนจนเมืองทmี่เปลี่ยนไปในสังคมเมืองที่กำลังเปลี่ยนแปลง สนับสนุนโดย สำนักงานคณะกรรมการส่งเสริมวิทยาศาสตร์ วิจัยและนวัตกรรม (สกสว.)

References

Agamben, G. (2005). State of Exception. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Agamben, G. (2020, March 14). Retrieved from the Book Haven: https://bookhaven.stanford.edu/2020/03/giorgio-agamben-on-coronavirus-t…

Douglas, M. (1966). Purity and Dange: An Analysis of Pollution and Taboo. London: Routledge Classics.

Fassin, D. (2009). Another Politics of Life is. Theory, Culture & Society, 44-60.

van Schendel, W., & De Maaker, E. (2014). Asian Borderlands: Introducing their Permeability, Strategic Uses and Meanings. Journal of Borderlands Studies, 29(1), 3-9. doi: 10.1080/08865655.2014.892689

——

This article was originally published on the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Southeast Asia website on 9 October 2020 at this link.

JOURNAL ARTICLE: Reciprocity in Practice: the Hydropolitics of Equitable and Reasonable Utilization in the Lancang-Mekong Basin

Publication date: 04 October 2020

Publication: International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics

Authors: Carl Middleton & David J. Devlaeminck

Abstract:

Equitable and reasonable utilization (ERU), the cornerstone of international water law, recognizes the rights of states to utilize shared water resources. However, there is ambiguity in ERU’s application, and upstream states often perceive it as against their interests. Recent research highlights the important role reciprocity plays in international water law, yet how reciprocity is practiced in transboundary water governance remains poorly understood. Combining literature on international law, hydropolitics and international relations, this article conceptualizes ‘reciprocity in practice’ for international watercourses as interconnected legal, social and political processes by which state and non-state actors negotiate ERU and distribute benefits and harms. We pay particular attention to power relations and perceptions of fairness that influence the form and (dis)continuity of reciprocity. We demonstrate our approach through an analysis of evolving legal regimes and issues of navigation, hydropower, flood and drought management, and economic regionalization in the Lancang-Mekong basin, focusing on relations between China and downstream states. We demonstrate how multiple forms of reciprocity occur simultaneously across issues that are often analyzed individually, complicating common narratives of China’s unilateralism. We show, however, that practiced positive reciprocity is weak and exclusive, generating distrust and resistance from those excluded or who experience harms. Overall, we suggest that processes of ‘reciprocity in practice’ are at the heart of meaningful negotiation, institutionalization and practice of ERU, and that, as a model of water allocation, ERU should be contextualized to wider process of allocation of benefits and harms that include but go beyond water, and in which power relations fundamentally matter.

Keywords: UN Watercourses Convention, Mekong River Commission, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, Lancang dam cascade, Equitable and reasonable use

Read the abstract in Chinese (Mandarin) here.

See the article here.

Citation: Middleton, C., and Devlaeminck, D.J. (2020) Reciprocity in practice: the hydropolitics of equitable and reasonable utilization in the Lancang-Mekong basin. Int Environ Agreements.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-020-09511-6

JOURNAL ARTICLE: ASEAN in the South China Sea Conflict, 2012–2018: A Lesson in Conflict Transformation from Normative Power Europe

Publication date: 4 July 2020

Publication: International Economics and Economic Policy

Author: Kasira Cheeppensook

Abstract:

For decades, overlapping territorial claims to the South China Sea have had a destabilizing effect in East and Southeast Asia, with broader implications beyond the region. Four ASEAN countries (Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) are direct claimants in the South China Sea conflict. ASEAN’s role, as a regional organization, in facilitating peaceful resolution of these claims and maintaining stability is challenging because the conflict presents potentially divisive rifts among ASEAN members themselves. This paper explores ASEAN’s role in managing the South China Sea conflict by examining the actions of two non-claimant states that functioned as country coordinators for ASEAN–China relations from 2012 to 2018: Thailand and Singapore. The efforts of these two countries as honest brokers shed light on how ASEAN can deal with this ongoing crisis so as to ensure the organization’s ongoing effectiveness and sustain regional harmony. The concept of normative power is employed to explain the potential role of non-claimant states in conflict transformation.

Keywords: ASEAN, South China Sea, Normative power Europe

See the article here.

Citation: Cheeppensook, K. ASEAN in the South China Sea conflict, 2012–2018: A lesson in conflict transformation from normative power Europe. Int Econ Econ Policy 17, 747–764 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-020-00477-z

JOURNAL ARTICLE: Shaping Ocean Governance: A Study of EU Normative Power on Thailand’s Sustainable Fisheries

Publication date: 22 June 2020

Publication: International Economics and Economic Policy

Authors: Ajaree Tavornmas, Kasira Cheeppensook

Abstract:

The European Union (EU) has been championing an agenda for better ocean governance based on a cross-sectoral, rules-based international approach and indicated its role as a strong global actor in this field. The EU, as reflected through its strategies adopted during the last decade (2005–2015), aims to shape international ocean governance on the basis of its experience in developing a sustainable and ethical approach to ocean management, notably through its environment policy and regulatory regime. This paper observes a significant transition of the EU internal policy towards a more externally-oriented one as well as its ambition in exporting the EU norms to third countries. It seems that the EU aims to lead this maritime and fisheries domain as a global actor, diffusing norms via interstate relations. The case study of EU policy towards Thailand fisheries policy, resulting in Thailand’s adopting sustainable fisheries policy in 2015 will be explored in this research paper. In addition, the paper aims to analyse the development and evolution of Thailand’s sustainable fisheries policy during 2015–2019 and to examine the rationales behind Thailand’s shift towards more environmentally and socially friendly fisheries policy. It focuses on how and in what ways Thailand as a third country has been influenced by the EU normative power in the maritime and fisheries domain and in particular, by the EU’s illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) or “IUU Regulation” entered into force since 2010 as one of its main tools to promote ocean governance.

Keywords: Ocean governance, European Union (EU), Normative power, EU illegal, Unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) regulation, Sustainability, Sustainable fisheries, Thailand

See the article here.

Citation: Tavornmas, A., & Cheeppensook, K. (2020). Shaping ocean governance: A study of EU normative power on Thailand’s sustainable fisheries. International Economics and Economic Policy, 17(3), 671–685. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-020-00475-1

JOURNAL ARTICLE: The Salween River as a Transboundary Commons: Fragmented Collective Action, Hybrid Governance and Power

Publication date: 28 July 2020

Publication: Asia Pacific Viewpoint

Authors: Diana Suhardiman, Carl Middleton

Abstract:

Viewing the Salween River as a transboundary commons, this paper illustrates how diverse state and non‐state actors and institutions in hybrid and multi‐scaled networks have influenced water governance in general, and large dam decision‐making processes in particular. Putting power relations at the centre of this analysis and drawing on the conceptual lenses of hybrid governance and critical institutionalism, we show the complexity of the fragmented processes through which decisions have been arrived at, and their implications. In the context of highly asymmetrical power relations throughout the basin, and the absence of an intergovernmental agreement to date, we argue that hybrid networks of state and non‐state actors could be strategically engaged to connect parallel and fragmented decision‐making landscapes with a goal of inclusively institutionalising the transboundary commons and maintaining connected local commons throughout the basin, foregrounding a concern for ecological and social justice.

Keywords: China, large hydropower dams, limited statehood, Myanmar, Thailand, water governance

See the article here.

Citation: Suhardiman, D., & Middleton, C. (2020). The Salween River as a transboundary commons: Fragmented collective action, hybrid governance and power. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 61(2), 301–314. https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12284

ธรรมชาติเชิงวิพากษ์: การท่องเที่ยวชุมชนในประเทศไทย: ผลกระทบและการฟื้นฟูจากการระบาดของโรค COVID-19

เรื่องโดย: อรพรรณ ปถมเล็ก*

[English version available here]

รถสองแถวบริการรับ-ส่งนักท่องเที่ยวระหว่างตัวเมืองระนอง-กะเปอร์

ล่องแพเปียกคลองลัดโนด เป็นกิจกรรมการท่องเที่ยวเชิงนิเวศน์ที่ได้รับความนิยมเป็นอย่างมากจากนักท่องเที่ยวทั้งชาวไทยและชาวต่างชาติ ซึ่งเป็นการออกแบบการท่องเที่ยวที่ผสมผสานระหว่างการผจญภัยอันน่าตื่นเต้นควบคู่ไปกับการอนุรักษ์ทรัพยากรธรรมชาติและสิ่งแวดล้อมผ่านการบริหารจัดการโดยสมาชิกในชุมชนภายใต้วิสาหกิจชุมชนท่องเที่ยวตำบลม่วงกลวง จ.ระนอง ชุมชนม่วงกลวงได้รับการชื่นชมยินดีสำหรับความพยายามกระตุ้นและผลักดันให้หน่วยงานราชการท้องถิ่นเข้ามามีส่วนร่วมในการช่วยเหลือทางด้านการประชาสัมพันธ์และการตลาดเพื่อให้เกิดการท่องเที่ยวและการกระจายรายได้แก่สมาชิกในชุมชน ผลสำเร็จนี้ปรากฏอย่างชัดเจนเมื่อวิสาหกิจชุมชนท่องเที่ยวชุนชนตำบลม่วงกลวงได้รับรางวัลอุตสาหกรรมการท่องเที่ยวไทย ครั้งที่ 12 ประจำปี 2562 ในสาขาแหล่งท่องเที่ยวชุมชนจากการท่องเที่ยวแห่งประเทศไทย

คลิ๊กที่นี่เพื่อดาวน์โหลดเอกสารฉบับเต็มในรูปแบบ PDF 

*สังกัด: ศูนย์เชี่ยวชาญเฉพาะทางด้านการเมืองทรัพยากรเพื่อการพัฒนาสังคม, ศูนย์ศึกษาเพื่อการพัฒนาสังคม คณะรัฐศาสตร์ จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

*โครงการสร้างเสริมพลังจุฬาฯ ก้าวสู่ศตวรรษที่ 2 ช่วงที่ 2 ประเภท โครงการมหาวิทยาลัยกำหนดประเด็น (ครั้งที่1/2562) เรื่อง โครงการการพัฒนาการท่องเที่ยวเชิงสร้างสรรค์ โดย สำนักบริหารวิจัย ผ่านการบริหารโครงการวิจัยโดยสถาบันเอเชียศึกษา จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

CRITICAL NATURE: Community-Based Tourism in Thailand: Impact and Recovery from the COVID-19

by Orapan Pratomlek*

[Thai version available here]

Local Taxi that provide service for toursits visiting (c) Orapan Pratomlek

Introduction

The bamboo rafting in Klong Lad Node is an ecotourism activity popular among both Thai and foreign tourists. Managed by the Community Tourism Enterprise of Muang Kluang in Ranong Province, this activity combines adventure with preserving the natural environment. The Muang Kluang community has received acclaim for their efforts to encourage local government agencies to participate in helping with promotion and marketing tourism in the community. In 2019, in recognition of their efforts, the community received the 12th Thai Tourism Industry Award in the category of Community-Based Tourism from the Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT)[i].

Muang Kluang located in Kapoe District in Ranong Province is a Muslim community where the main sources of livelihood are fishing, gardening and raising livestock. Community tourism in Muang Kluang is operated through small community enterprises that empowers the local people by involving them in decisions over natural resources management. During the tourism season from November to February, the community can get extra income providing services for taxi and boat tours, as local guides, for homestay, and for selling local home-made products. The community act as local entrepreneurs using tourism to support the local economy while also acting as conservationists in preserving natural ecosystems.

But the emergence of COVID-19 in Thailand has affected community tourism. The travel restrictions and country-wide lockdowns and curfews have caused severe economic distress by shutting down all tourism activities. Visitors can no longer travel to communities like Muang Kluang because of the fear of spreading the disease. This not only affects local tourism but also the mental state of the community members who increasingly feel insecure about their health and livelihoods. The lack of tourism and income-earning opportunities has made their future uncertain while they wait for government support and the economic recovery post COVID-19.

At present, like many others around the world, the Muang Kluang community is uncertain about how long the pandemic will last and the government’s measures to revitalize tourism. Before the COVID -19 outbreak, the community already met significant challenges in carrying out tourism activities due to the topographical and climatic conditions of Ranong province with its long rainy season. The pandemic has further complicated matters creating a major challenge for the community to rebuild confidence and sustainable tourism activities along with efforts to recover their health and local economy after the pandemic.

In this article, I discuss the importance of community tourism in Thailand, and propose ways to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic that support and empower community-led tourism initiatives.

Community-based tourism and plan in practice

Community-based tourism as a tourism activity is mainly concerned with supporting the community to earn some income through tourism activities together with local environmental conservation[ii]. It can be a tool to strengthen local community organizations in managing resources through enhanced local participation in formulating and implementing plans for local community development and resource management.

Alongside the large-scale mainstream tourism industry, community-based tourism has opened up spaces for creating income and development based on local decision-making. Community members act as service providers to assist the visitor, but at the same time also undertake to monitor and preserve the local resources from degradation. This kind of tourism can help empower the community and provide a sense of identity especially to poor or marginalized communities. At the same time, compared to the mainstream tourism business, community tourism also allows for the visitor to obtain a more direct social and cultural experience by interacting closely with local ways of life. Community-based tourism operates for local benefits while also not being completely dependent on it as a source of income in case visitor arrivals drop for economic or other reasons. 

Thailand is widely recognized as a key tourist destination with the country reliant on tourism as one of the main pillars of economic growth. The Government of Thailand has acknowledged the importance of distributing tourism income from the national to the local level in line with the government’s national development plan. In the ongoing National Tourism Development Plan No.2 (2018 - 2021)[iii], the government aims to further improve the quality of tourism. The government tourism promotion policy has an influence on the local government authorities in trying to motivate and encourage the community to implement and create new tourism projects and activities and meet the needs of tourists.

Under the National Tourism Development Plan, sustainable tourism management is considered as a challenge for the community to create a new form of tourism activity with increasing competitiveness and larger market share. The government provides financial aid and technology to assist local agencies and communities for effective tourism management as well as tourism promotion projects both to publicize tourism and empower the communities.

The government also provides incentives for community tourism. In 2018, the Council of Ministers approved a budget of nearly 10 billion Thai Baht to promote community based-tourism activities and products under the "OTOP Inno-life Tourism-Based Community"[iv], which is managed by the Community Development Department. The concept of this project is to introduce modern innovations combined with the villager’s traditional way of life and promote local products in tourism activities. According to the plan, tourism will draw on the charm of the community culture and natural resources. Much of this budget has been allocated to the Provincial authorities in order to operate and promote tourism plans by working closely with local agencies and representatives in setting measures for the community to enhance sustainable tourism management and promote local products[v]. However, not all communities are able to successfully implement tourism activities due to their lack of understanding of what is expected for tourism management under the project, while some communities also face difficulties in accessing the financial support from the government. But if the community formulates an effective tourism plan and short-term strategic framework, this can motivate and encourage community members to participate in tourism plans.

The community strategic tourism plan is a key mechanism for tourism development that could provide large benefits to the community. However, there are still many factors that affect local participation in tourism development. These include lack of understanding of how to participate, and of the benefits and the roles in possible tourism activities. Therefore, it is necessary to encourage the community members to develop their potential through sharing and discussing the necessary knowledge of the pros and cons of tourism as well as connecting tourism activities between communities to add value to local products.

The Muang Kluang community is trying to encourage community members to get more involved in tourism activities by being a member of the community enterprise group and recognizing the importance of tourism. Aside from the benefits such as income generation, tourism can also help strengthen negotiation power between the community and the local government in order to preserve and maintain natural resources. Local tourism activities such as bamboo rafting activities raise environmental awareness about conservation of ecological systems in mangrove forests. The tourism activities involve the participation of community members, and ensure that the economic benefits are distributed fairly and equally. Income distribution to communities has been calculated and decided jointly between the committees and the members of the community enterprise groups. During the tourism season, the average income will be around 500 – 1,000 Thai Baht per day, but it can be increase by around 3-10% during the peak of tourism.

Thailand tourism and impact of the disease COVID – 19

Tourism is a key economic activity in Thailand, generating 9% - 17% of GDP[vi]. The outbreak of COVID – 19 has led to the decline in the number of foreign tourists entering the country. From January – March 2020, the number of foreign tourists was 6.69 million people, which is 38% less than last year. The income generated from tourism, at 330 billion baht, is 40% less compared to the same period last year.[vii]

The unexpected occurrence of the pandemic has affected tourism and its related services at both the national and community levels. Furthermore, the government’s promulgation of the Emergency Decree along with curfew measures has caused economic disruption in local community tourism areas like Muang Kluang. At present, the community enterprise group is attempting to provide economic remedies for its members by processing products for sale or distributing aid to those in need. However, this ad hoc measure to respond to the crisis is not enough to meet community members’ needs.

Under this emergency situation, the government has issued measures to deal with the spread of the COVID-19 which mainly focuses on the reduction of infection among people through measures such as travel prohibition across provinces and self-quarantine efforts. There are measures to remedy those affected by lack of income and unemployment. This may help deal with the immediate problems, but in restoring the economy and tourism after the pandemic, it is necessary to have comprehensive policies and measures in order to solve the problems.

Recovering for the better in community tourism

The outbreak of COVID-19 is changing Thailand’s economic, social and political structures, as people try to cope with the ‘new normal’. Many policymakers and scholars predict further macro-level impacts that can affect people in both rural and urban areas. However, the range and impacts of these problems are still far from being fully understood. The lockdown and curfew measures are affecting local community tourism activities. How can the Muang Kluang community adapt, what are the new conditions under which tourism activities will have to be undertaken, and what does the future hold?

In the short-term, the government should provide financial aid for affected community tourism businesses to stimulate employment in the tourism and service industry, and to encourage the community to prepare for the return of tourists after COVID-19. Financial support can be distributed by allocating budgets from the central government to the provinces that can then help to provide aid and assistance to the community through the community saving cooperatives.  The community should be prepared by empowering their members to rebuild the community tourism. For example, the community needs to assess their tourism sites and provide clear guidelines for safety and cleanliness consistent with current guidelines on preventing COVID-19 transmission to build the trust of tourists who are interested to visit the community.

The medium-term measures should aim to create tourism activities designed by the community that attracts tourists with diverse interests that also respects local cultures and protects the environment. The government should support these initiatives in various ways, such as providing tools and experts. Additionally, financial support and investment in community tourism should be provided in order to support employment and empower community members developing local products and services.

In the long-term, further integration among the community tourism plans and the government’s tourism framework is needed. The community should bring new policy recommendations for tourism development with the support of local government agencies in order to encourage long-term sustainable tourism. The government agencies can help in promoting cooperation with the private sector in creating marketing plans or designing tourism activities that are consistent with the local ways of life while increasing the value of local resources and knowledge. Promoting domestic tourism may also offer more economic sustainability than continued dependence on international visitors especially when a pandemic occurs that halts overseas travel.  

Lastly, to rebuild the local economy and support local income generation through community tourism like at Muang Kluang, it may be necessary to strengthen local knowledge to deal with health or other crisis caused by external factors. This can help build the confidence of community members and visitors to return to the community and create a learning process to strengthen tourism in the community.

—--

 * Researcher, Center of Excellence in Resource Politics for Social Development, Center for Social Development Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University

โครงการสร้างเสริมพลังจุฬาฯ ก้าวสู่ศตวรรษที่ 2 ช่วงที่ 2 ประเภท โครงการมหาวิทยาลัยกำหนดประเด็น (ครั้งที่1/2562) เรื่อง โครงการการพัฒนาการท่องเที่ยวเชิงสร้างสรรค์ โดย สำนักบริหารวิจัย ผ่านการบริหารโครงการวิจัยโดยสถาบันเอเชียศึกษา จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

[i] Boonluang Phromprathanakun., 77kaoded.com, “Float Rafting in Klong Lad Node” won the Thailand Tourism Award on Community-Based Tourism, 3 October 2019 https://www.77kaoded.com/news/bunluan/892596

[ii] Department of Tourism (2018) “The Tourism Development Strategic Plan 2018-2021” May 2018

[iii] Department of Tourism (2018) ‘The Tourism Development Strategic Plan 2018 – 2021’ May 2018

[iv] Community Development Department, Ministry of Interior, “Guidebook for OTOP Inno-life Tourism-Based Community Operation and Management”

[v] OTOP Inno-life Tourism-Based Community project management and Guideline 2018

[vi] Wikipedia, Tourism in Thailand https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tourism_in_Thailand

[vii] Ministry of Tourism & Sports, Executive Summary on Thailand Tourism Situation in March 2020, https://www.mots.go.th/download/article/article_20200428141351.pdf

CRITICAL NATURE: Are China’s Dams on the Mekong Causing Downstream Drought? The Importance of Scientific Debate

by Marko Kallio* and Amy Fallon**

Xiaowan Dam in Nanjian County, Yunnan Province, Southwest China. Photo Credit: Guillaume Lacombe/Cirad

A recent report by Eyes on Earth (EoE)[i] highlighted the critical issue of China’s hydropower development and dam operation on the Lancang (upper Mekong) River and connected it to the ongoing drought in the lower Mekong basin. The report sparked numerous articles in regional and international news outlets[ii],[iii],[iv],[v], think tanks[vi], and online public discussion[vii]. Independent research groups and the Mekong River Commission (MRC) have questioned the EoE report’s methodology and its conclusions[viii],[ix], and called for increased cooperation between MRC member states and China.

Here, we outline some key scientific issues regarding the report and the assertions drawn from it, adding our own independent analysis of the EoE study, and suggest a constructive path forward based on the importance of data-sharing, rigorous peer review, and evidence-based democratized decision-making.

Evaluating the EoE report and considering its claims

The EoE report presents a statistical model to predict water level at the Chiang Saen monitoring station in Northern Thailand using a remotely sensed wetness index. It concludes that the 2019 lower Mekong drought was largely due to water being stored behind dams on the Lancang River in China, rather than an absolute shortage of water. Additional commentary on the report has gone further, and statements were made that China “entirely prevented the annual monsoon-driven rise in river level”.[vi]

The EoE report and subsequent commentary reveal key issues about the role of scientific research in sensitive and at times heated public discussions, such as the hydrological impacts of upstream dams on the lower Mekong River. That a public discussion is taking place on this crucial issue is positive, as there few forums to meaningfully discuss the impacts and ways forward, particularly for communities affected directly. But caution is also required on how science is drawn upon as a form of knowledge within such debates.

The commentary from the Stimson Center based on the EoE report does highlight a key issue that should be of public concern in downstream countries: the generation capacity of China’s upstream Mekong dams currently far exceeds China’s electricity demand[x], indicating there was likely potential for the release of water downstream to where it was needed during the drought, without undermining China’s domestic electricity security.  Yet, there are also several shortcomings in the EoE report itself and therefore the subsequent interpretation of it also hold policy implications.

A key limitation of the EoE report is that the authors’ analysis was based on water level, rather than water volume, giving only a partial picture of the situation on the Lancang River. This led to exaggerated claims that went beyond what could be justifiably concluded by the study – that the dam cascade withheld an entire monsoon season’s worth of rainfall. This was predominantly due to incomplete data access; the authors of the report had only obtained water level data from the MRC[viii],[ix], which limited the analysis to a simplified methodology based on this data and satellite imagery. The persistent data scarcity in the region significantly reduces the comprehensiveness of hydrological studies.

Such issues highlight the importance of acknowledging the study’s limitations, which is common practice in published scientific studies and helps avoid black-and-white conclusions, as seen in this case[ii],[vi]. The study’s methodological sturdiness also comes under question given the apparent lack of a rigorous peer-review process.  It is widely recognised that modelling reservoir operations is a difficult task in the absence of detailed data. During a recent panel discussion [vii] online with one of the report’s authors, peer-review of the method[xi] was mentioned, but it is difficult to substantiate such claims without a transparent scientific peer-review process (i.e. through publication in a scientific journal, or corroboration by multiple research groups) of the methodology for this particular purpose[xii].

A case for plural science

Curious about the conclusions reached in the EoE report and recognizing the high stakes within the subsequent public discussion, we wanted to critically scrutinize the report’s validity as would be conducted in an independent peer review process. Here, we briefly present our independent check to test the conclusion on Chinese dam operation – a discussion which is lacking in the report and related documents – and to demonstrate the usefulness of a wide range of model structures and input data.

The EoE report provides results in terms of water level, but this cannot be turned into water volume without a rating curve[xiii] at Chiang Saen. We therefore estimated runoff produced upstream of the Jinghong Dam – the last in the Lancang cascade – using a total of 26 freely and openly available runoff datasets[xiv]. Drawing on recent studies[xv], we estimated the Lancang cascade’s active storage capacity to be 25.6-27.1 km3.

Importantly, only two of the 26 datasets predict (on average) smaller runoff volume produced during the wet season than the Lancang cascade active storage capacity (Figure 1A).  The ensemble mean[xvi] of our estimates is 43.8 (+3.7/-3.6) km3, suggesting that the cascade can store 54-68% of the runoff produced in an average year. Figure 1B shows the cumulative sum of runoff produced in an average wet season. We can infer from this figure – assuming that all the active storage capacity was available at the start of the wet season and all incoming water was stored – that the cascade would be entirely filled sometime in July or August.

Figure 1) 26 independent estimates and the ensemble mean of A) the range of runoff produced upstream of Jinghong dam during rainy season, and B) the cumulative runoff produced during wet season. The active storage capacity of the Lancang cascade is shown. The ensemble mean is highlighted. (Credit: the authors)

We consider our results robust: the annual runoff estimated by the ensemble mean, 53.2 (+5.1/-4.9) km3, is in line with Räsänen et al.[xvii], who estimate the annual inflow to Jinghong as 58 km3 (1840 m3 s-1). We also find good correspondence when comparing to the observed streamflow at Chiang Saen during a natural flow regime (1960-1990). Our method estimates wet season runoff at Chiang Saen as 65.9 (+5.8/-5.0) km3, and annual runoff 79.6 (+7.3/-6.9) km3, while observed streamflow is 64.7 (+3.9/-4.0) km3 and 85.5 (+4.0/-4.5) km3, respectively.

By changing the research question and designing a methodology to address this question under data scarcity, we arrive at an opposite conclusion from the discussed reports – it seems likely that the upper Mekong Basin experienced drought-like conditions. If we accept the presented evidence showing the reservoirs at a high water level at the start of the 2019 wet season[ii],[vii], the Lancang cascade in China would have been overwhelmed by the inflowing water of an average wet season and would not have been able to prevent the flood pulse at Chiang Saen.

It should be noted that our approach, like the discussed EoE report, arises from incomplete data availability, and as a simple bucket model does not consider dam operations, transmission losses or water withdrawals. To further the debate, we make our code available for public review in GitHub[xviii]. However, an ensemble approach, like the one presented here, can facilitate discussion about modelling beyond questions looking for simple conclusions, and acknowledging multiple ways to overcome challenges[xix] inherent in hydrological modelling.

What can we do to address these shortfalls?

The issues we have highlighted here demonstrate the need for a constructive path forward, for which we propose four suggestions. First, open data-sharing is critical for comprehensive hydrological modelling of the Mekong. Without this, it is impossible to gain a true understanding of what is occurring across the basin, and opens the process up for unconstructive politicization and the closing of potential channels of dialogue[xx]. Unfortunately, China’s persistent lack of data-sharing with downstream countries, despite many assurances and invitations to share data[xxi], means that at the present time only such incomplete assessments of the impact of the upper dam cascade are possible. Thus, regardless of the shortcomings of research findings, China’s lack of transparency has brought about assumptions of dishonesty regarding its lack of release of water to downstream Mekong countries during the 2019 drought. In terms of data sharing, the ball is firmly in China’s court to act upon it.

Second, we emphasise the need for objective, credible science, particularly in such complex settings where there is a diverse range of perspectives, knowledge and agendas. From a hydrological modelling perspective, this can be achieved using a range of different model structures and assumptions which account for a wide range of plausible outcomes. This arises from acknowledging that there is no such thing as a ‘perfect’ model, and therefore uncertainty needs to be clearly communicated. Credibility of modelling can only be verified through a rigorous peer-review process and with the use of comprehensive model evaluation frameworks. Such frameworks acknowledge modelling as a social process[xxii], not merely a technical one.

Following from this is the need for a plurality of perspectives both within the scientific community across disciplines, and across society, as water resource sharing in the Mekong is debated. For example, increased inclusion of Chinese researchers would be highly beneficial, not just from a knowledge-perspective in ensuring rigorous debate, but also a diplomatic one to ensure that there is broad agreement – and constructive contestation - on how the analysis unfolds. Furthermore, when the intrinsically plural nature of knowledge is recognised, scientific advice can become more robust and democratically accountable[xxiii]. For this, we must also ensure research is inclusive of both physical and social sciences, and community knowledge.

Finally, research should be used as a catalyst for science-based policy discussions in the public domain, rather than the means toward a definitive answer that shuts down conversation. Despite their shortfalls, the EoE and Stimson reports have certainly achieved this. We, however, caution the oversimplification of findings in facilitating such discussion, to not undermine the credibility of science within public discourse.

Overall, we hope to see dialogue that is not one-way from ‘experts’ to the public, but rather an iterative process that encourages democratic debate. This requires a certain level of humility, both on the part of scientists and policymakers.

Concluding Remarks

The report from EoE and associated public discussion have connected China’s cascade of dams to the ongoing drought in the Mekong Region, and highlighted the role - and responsibilities - of scientists in untangling the complex web of environmental issues along the Mekong River.

As our analysis and commentary of others[viii],[ix] have demonstrated, there are weaknesses in the methodology used that undermine the claims that China completely held back the 2019 wet season flow. Our analysis suggests that it is improbable that China’s dam cascade can store an entire wet season’s worth of rainfall, and subsequently be the primary cause of the 2019 drought. But we agree that China could have alleviated the drought conditions by releasing more water from the reservoirs, even as it would be at China’s cost of sacrificing part of its underutilized electricity generation potential.

We therefore suggest a constructive path forward: (1) increase public availability of data which, (2) informs a wide range of rigorously-debated scientific studies across disciplines – an example of which we have provided here. (3) The subsequent scientific debates should be accountable to and informed by the needs of multiple groups across society, including communities and states. (4) Encourage and support evidence-based and democratized decision-making. Only through this can we hope to achieve cooperative and equitable sharing of water resources along the Mekong River.

Acknowledgment

We would like to thank Rajesh Daniel and Carl Middleton for their helpful comments and editorial review of this article.

—-

[i] Basist, A., and C. Williams. 2020. ‘Monitoring the Quantity of Water Flowing Through the Upper Mekong Basin Under Natural (Unimpeded) Conditions’. Sustainable Infrastructure Partnership, Bangkok.

[ii] Eyler, B. 2020. ‘Science Shows Chinese Dams Are Devastating the Mekong’. Foreign Policy (blog). 22 April 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/22/science-shows-chinese-dams-devastating-mekong-river/.

[iii] Beech, H. 2020. ‘China Limited the Mekong’s Flow. Other Countries Suffered a Drought.’ The New York Times, 13 April 2020, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/13/world/asia/china-mekong-drought.html.

[iv] Reuters. 2020a. ‘Chinese Dams Held Back Mekong Waters during Drought, Study Finds’, 13 April 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mekong-river-idUSKCN21V0U7.

[v] Reuters. 2020b. ‘Mekong River Groups Urge China to Show Transparency after Dam Report’, 15 April 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mekong-river-idUSKCN21X1LG.

[vi] Eyler, B. and Weatherby, C. 2020. ‘New Evidence: How China Turned off the Tap on the Mekong River’. The Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/2020/new-evidence-how-china-turned-off-the-mekong-tap/.

[vii]  Foreign Correspondent’s Club Thailand. 2020. ‘Mekong Update: New Evidence of China’s Dam Impacts, and Why It Matters | FCCThai’. 23 April 2020. https://www.fccthai.com/events/mekong-update-new-evidence-of-chinas-dam-impacts-and-why-it-matters/. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5YXLz4V-JbY

[viii] Ketelsen, T., J. Sawdon, and T. A. Räsänen. 2020. ‘Monitoring the Quantity of Water Flowing through the Upper Mekong Basin under Natural (Unimpeded) Conditions - Rapid Review’. Ho Chi Minh City, AMPERES. https://www.amperes.com.au/s/AMPERES-Review_Basist-et-al_Lancang-flows-19-April-2020.pdf.

[ix] Mekong River Commission. 2020. ‘Understanding the Mekong River’s Hydrological Conditions: A Brief Commentary Note on the “Monitoring the Quantity of Water Flowing the Upper Mekong Basin Under Natural (Unimpeded) Conditions” by Alan Basist and Claude Williams (2020)’. Mekong River Commission.

[x] Magee, D. and Hennig, T. 2017.  ‘Hydropower Boom in China and along Asia’s Rivers Outpaces Regional Electricity Demand’. The Third Pole. https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2017/04/28/hydropower-boom-in-china-and-along-asias-rivers-outpaces-regional-electricity-demand/.

[xi] The peer-review likely refers to: Basist, A., Williams, C., Ross, T.F., Menne, M.J., Grody, N., Ferraro, R., Shen, S. and Chang, A.T.C. 2001. ‘Using the Special Sensor Microwave Imager to Monitor Surface Wetness’. Journal of Hydrometeorology 2 (3): 297–308.

[xii] The purpose of monitoring dam operations.

[xiii] A rating curve is a mathematical model (equation) which describes the relationship between water level and discharge.

[xiv] We used 24 different combinations of Global Hydrological Models and reanalysis climate forcing datasets available from the Intersectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project. These are generally uncalibrated model runs, so we complemented them with two global runoff products optimized with streamflow records: LORA and GRUN. For ISIMIP data, refer to Gosling, Simon, Hannes Müller Schmied, Richard Betts, Jinfeng Chang, Philippe Ciais, Rutger Dankers, Petra Döll, et al. 2017. ‘ISIMIP2a Simulation Data from Water (Global) Sector’. GFZ Data Services. https://doi.org/10.5880/pik.2017.010, for LORA refer to Hobeichi, Sanaa, Gab Abramowitz, Jason Evans, and Hylke E. Beck. 2019. ‘Linear Optimal Runoff Aggregate (LORA): A Global Gridded Synthesis Runoff Product’. Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 23 (2): 851–70. https://doi.org/10.5194/hess-23-851-2019,  and for GRUN, refer to Ghiggi, Gionata, Vincent Humphrey, Sonia I. Seneviratne, and Lukas Gudmundsson. 2019. ‘GRUN: An Observations-Based Global Gridded Runoff Dataset from 1902 to 2014’. Earth System Science Data, March, 1–32. https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-11-1655-2019.    

[xv] Total storage capacity 46.4 km3 was obtained from the WLE Greater Mekong Dam Observatory. We estimated the active storage by computing the ratio of total-to-active storage ratio from available values in Table 1 in Räsänen et al. (2017), and multiplying the total storage with the ratio 0.584 for higher, and 0.551 for lower estimate. Active storage capacity refers to the volume which is available for dam operators to work with. Dam data from Mekong Region Futures Institute. 2020. ‘Dataset on the Dams of the Greater Mekong’. Mekong Region Futures Institute, Bangkok. Active storage ratio from Räsänen, Timo A., Paradis Someth, Hannu Lauri, Jorma Koponen, Juha Sarkkula, and Matti Kummu. 2017. ‘Observed River Discharge Changes Due to Hydropower Operations in the Upper Mekong Basin’. Journal of Hydrology 545 (February): 28–41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2016.12.023.

[xvi] An ensemble mean is the average of a collection of many estimates. Here it refers to the average value of  combining all of the 26 individual estimates.

[xvii] Räsänen, Timo A., Jorma Koponen, Hannu Lauri, and Matti Kummu. 2012. ‘Downstream Hydrological Impacts of Hydropower Development in the Upper Mekong Basin’. Water Resources Management 26 (12): 3495–3513. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-012-0087-0.

[xviii] https://github.com/mkkallio/Upper_Mekong_capacity_check

[xix] See e.g. Seibert, Jan, and H. J. (Ilja) van Meerveld. 2016. ‘Hydrological Change Modeling: Challenges and Opportunities’. Hydrological Processes 30 (26): 4966–71. https://doi.org/10.1002/hyp.10999, Fatichi, Simone, Enrique R. Vivoni, Fred L. Ogden, Valeriy Y. Ivanov, Benjamin Mirus, David Gochis, Charles W. Downer, et al. 2016. ‘An Overview of Current Applications, Challenges, and Future Trends in Distributed Process-Based Models in Hydrology’. Journal of Hydrology 537 (June): 45–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2016.03.026 or Blair, P, and W Buytaert. 2016. ‘Socio-Hydrological Modelling: A Review Asking “Why, What and How?”’ Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci 20: 443–478. https://doi.org/10.5194/hess-20-443-2016.

[xx] Pielke Jr., Roger A. 2007. ‘The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics’. Cambridge Core. Cambridge University Press. April 2007. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818110.

[xxi] See e.g. Biba, Sebastian. 2018. China’s Hydro-Politics in the Mekong : Conflict and Cooperation in Light of Securitization Theory. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315148663.

[xxii] See e.g. Hamilton, Serena H., Baihua Fu, Joseph H. A. Guillaume, Jennifer Badham, Sondoss Elsawah, Patricia Gober, Randall J. Hunt, et al. 2019. ‘A Framework for Characterising and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Environmental Modelling’. Environmental Modelling & Software 118 (August): 83–98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2019.04.008.

[xxiii] Stirling, Andy. 2010. ‘Keep It Complex’. Nature 468 (7327): 1029–31. https://doi.org/10.1038/4681029a.

—-

Author Bio:

*Marko Kallio is working at Aalto University doing multidisciplinary research about water scarcity estimation in data scarce areas with a background in environmental engineering (water management, B.Sc.) and geoinformatics (spatial analysis, cartography, M.Sc.). He has been working in the Mekong Region in various projects as a modeller in hydrology and renewable energy, both as a consultant and as a researcher. Drawing from his experience in hydrological modelling and research, he has come to the conclusion that hydrological modelling is hard. This realization led to one of Marko’s main research interests – bridging the gap between modellers and consumers of the outputs of their models. For the past few years, he has developed intuitive methods for utilizing freely and openly available hydrological information in areas where data is scarce – like the Mekong Region. Marko has frequently visited the area in the past years and hopes his research can help in ensuring a sustainable future for the whole region. (Email: marko.k.kallio@aalto.fi).

**Amy Fallon is a researcher at Aalto University’s Water and Development Research Group. She has a BSc. in Environmental Sciences and an MSc. in Water Security and International Development. Her doctoral thesis focuses on resilience-based approaches to water governance in dynamic river basins undergoing significant social and ecological transformations. Using case studies from South Africa and Cambodia, her research highlights the importance of considering non-linear dynamics and uncertainty, as well as the role of politics and power, in decision-making processes. Her most recent work on Cambodia’s Tonle Sap Lake uses critical institutionalism to take a more critical perspective on resilience, focusing on the question ‘resilience for whom?’. Amy is interested in environmental justice, and the use of science to advocate for the most marginalised groups of society who are frequently the most impacted by environmental issues. (Email: amy.fallon@aalto.fi).

REPORT: Contested Knowledges of the Commons in Southeast Asia Research Progress report - Vignettes from the Field (CRISEA Working Paper 2)

Publication date:
March 2020

Publication:
Contested Knowledges of the Commons in Southeast Asia Research Progress report - Vignettes from the Field

Edited and compiled:
Carl Middleton

Authors:
Monika Arnez, Sally Beckenham, David Chu, Robert A. Farnan, Tomasz Kamiński, Carl Middleton, Edyta Roszko, Thianchai Surimas, Amnuayvit Thitibordin, Andrea Valente, Michał Zaręba

Download the report here.

Historically until the present day, wide-ranging forms, scopes, intensities and durations of resource politics have shaped the concept and practice of development across Southeast Asia. In this report, we present eight vignettes that offer a sample of some of the varying characteristics of these resource politics and their implications for competition over resources and the commons, and social justice. The vignettes are the interim products of multidisciplinary research – and in one case transdisciplinary research - that is ongoing by team members of ‘Work Package 1 on the Environment’ of the EU-funded project Competing Regional Integrations in Southeast Asia (CRISEA).[1] 

In our first Working Paper, published in March 2019, we detailed our Work Package’s theoretical framework.[2] The core of the shared conceptual approach of our research is an examination of the co-production of ecological knowledge and ecological governance, viewed across the global, national and local scales. Here we draw upon the foundational work of Sheila Jasanoff (2004)[3], and as applied in Southeast Asia more recently by Gururani and Vandergeest (2014)[4] amongst others, to understand the remaking of nature-society relations in Southeast Asia. In short, as stated by Jasanoff (2004:2) “… co-production is shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it”. The co-production of natural and social orders are thus mediated by the production, circulation, integration and dissemination of knowledge, which itself must be contextualized to historical context, power relations, and culture.

The purpose of this Working Paper is to offer empirically grounded case studies of resource politics in practice in the region, as a work-in-progress. Overall, the research projects address three overarching themes: Transition into a low-carbon economy (Kamiński); Sea (Arnez; Roszko); and Rivers (Beckenham and Farnan; Chu; Middleton and Surimas; Thitibordin; Zaręba). We seek to analyze these cases through our project’s conceptual lens to generate both academic insight and policy-relevant recommendations, which will be the subject of forthcoming publications.

Please contact Dr. Carl Middleton for more information.

Citation: Arnez, M., Beckenham, S., Chu, D., Farnan, R.A., Kamiński, T., Middleton, C., Roszko, E., Surimas, T., Valente, A., and Zaręba, M. (2020) The Environment - Contested Knowledge of the Commons in Southeast Asia (CRISEA Working Paper 2). Research Progress report - Vignettes from the Field (CRISEA) Working Paper No. 2 (March 2020).

This report is part of our project The Contested Meanings of the Mekong River in Northern Thailand. You can visit the project page here.

——

[1] See http://crisea.eu/ for further details

[2] Kamiński, T., Arnez, M., Middleton, C., Beckenham, S., Farnan, R.A., Chu, D., Roszko, E., Thitibordin, A., Valente, A., and Zaręba, M. (2019) The Environment - Contested Knowledge of the Commons in Southeast Asia (CRISEA Working Paper 1). Competing Regional Integrations in Southeast Asia (CRISEA) Working Paper No. 1 (March 2019).

[3] Jasanoff, S. (2004). States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order. London: Routledge

[4] Gururani, S. & P. Vandergeest (2014). ‘Introduction: New Frontiers of Ecological Knowledge: Co-producing Knowledge and Governance in Asia.’ Conservation and Society 12(4): 343-351.

ธรรมชาติเชิงวิพากษ์: การจัดการภัยแล้งและการเปลี่ยนแปลงสภาพภูมิอากาศในแม่น้ำล้านช้าง-แม่โขง โดยแนวทางใหม่บนพื้นฐานธรรมชาติ

เรื่องโดย คาร์ล มิดเดิลตัน*

[English version available here]

MEKONG RIVER (c) CARL MIDDLETON

ปัจจุบันภูมิภาคลุ่มแม่น้ำโขงกำลังเผชิญกับภัยแล้งอย่างรุนแรง แม้ว่าเหลืออีกเพียง 3 เดือนจะเข้าสู่ฤดูฝนแต่ระดับน้ำในลุ่มแม่น้ำล้านช้าง-แม่โขงกลับลดระดับลงต่ำจนสันดอนทรายและโขดหินโผล่ออกมาอย่างเห็นได้ชัดเจนตลอดตามแนวแม่น้ำ ภัยแล้งได้ทำให้เกิดผลกระทบและความเสี่ยงต่อระบบนิเวศ การประมงและการเกษตร ความมั่นคงทางอาหาร วิถีการดำเนินชีวิตและแม้แต่การจัดหาน้ำเพื่อการอุปโภคบริโภค สำหรับผู้คนนับล้านที่วิถีชีวิตต้องพึ่งพาทรัพยากรจากแม่น้ำนั้นภัยแล้งคือมหันตภัยที่ก่อให้เกิดความยากลำบากในชีวิตอย่างรุนแรงผนวกกับการระบาดของเชื้อไวรัสโควิด-19 ที่กำลังเกิดขึ้นอยู่นี้ทำให้เพิ่มความท้าทายในการดำเนินชีวิตของพวกเขามากขึ้น

คลิ๊กที่นี่เพื่อดาวน์โหลดเอกสารฉบับเต็มในรูปแบบ PDF

*สังกัด: ศูนย์เชี่ยวชาญเฉพาะทางด้านการเมืองทรัพยากรเพื่อการพัฒนาสังคม, ศูนย์ศึกษาเพื่อการพัฒนาสังคม คณะรัฐศาสตร์ จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

CRITICAL NATURE: Addressing Drought and Climate Change on the Lancang-Mekong River Needs New and Nature-based Solutions

By Carl Middleton[i]

[Thai version available here]

Mekong River Carl Middleton

Introduction

The Mekong Region is currently facing a serious drought. Despite there being possibly three months until the next rainy season, the Lancang-Mekong River is already extremely low, with sand bars and rocky outcrops exposed along many stretches of the river. The drought places at risk ecosystems, fishing and farming livelihoods, wider food security, and even drinking water supply. For the millions whose livelihoods depend upon the river’s resources, the drought is creating severe hardship - compounded now further by the COVID-19 pandemic. 

The current drought is in fact the continuation of last year’s drought, which was already the worst in living memory.[ii] The delayed monsoon finally arrived in July, but then finished early and failed to fully replenish water sources. The drought’s intensity is further amplified by the El Niño weather pattern, which has raised temperatures and rates of evapotranspiration.[iii] The extent to which climate change is nowadays acting upon the basin is also an increasingly debated question[iv], and the subject of a growing number of studies.[v]

It has also been vigorously debated whether large dam infrastructure in the basin has exacerbated the impact of the drought, or could have been operated differently to better mitigate its impacts. A particular focus has been on the upstream dams in China, where eleven projects have been progressively built on the Lancang (upper-Mekong) River mainstream since the early 1990s.  This is because a significant proportion of the river’s dry-season flow originates from China, from the glacial melt of the river’s headwaters in the Tibetan Plateau, and more recently due to the significant reservoir storage now in place.

As the impacts of climate change deepen, severe drought threatens to become a part of the ‘new normal.’ The challenge of equitably ensuring water, food and energy security for all underscores the importance of improving - and rethinking - water governance and drought adaptation in the basin in the context of climate change.

Anticipated impacts of climate change

The Lancang-Mekong River is one of the world’s major river basins, and is second only to the Amazon in terms of biodiversity. Measuring 4,800 kilometers along the mainstem, it traverses China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. 72 million people live within the basin, and for a majority access to river resources remain central to livelihoods.  The river was largely free-flowing until the early 1990s, but nowadays it’s seasonal cycle of monsoon flooding and dry-season low flows are shaped by extensive hydropower dam operation.[vi]

According to UN-Water, “Water is the primary medium through which we will feel the effects of climate change.”[vii] In the Mekong region, anticipated and already occurring changes to the climate and hydrology, as well as sea-level rise, are increasingly center to public debates and policy concerns. Whilst there is always uncertainty in making predictions on climate change, the best available analysis anticipates weather change including a mean temperature rise of 0.2 oC per decade, a regional increase in annual precipitation of 200 mm, more regular severe floods and droughts, and greater seasonal uncertainty. Meanwhile, sea level rise will increasingly threaten the low-lying delta area.[viii]

Climate change trends, however, need to be considered in the context of existing challenges within the basin. These include the changing flow regime and reduced sediment loads due to extensive dam construction, loss of wetlands and degrading riverine ecosystems, and weaknesses in transboundary water governance including incomplete water data sharing and the accountability of river-related decision-making – especially related to large hydropower dams [ix]. Climate change will intersect with and amplify these challenges[x], posing risks to terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, agriculture and fisheries, livelihoods and food security, as well as national economic growth, especially under drier climate scenarios.[xi]

For example, the delta area in Vietnam is at risk from sea-level rise, a risk that is further heightened by the reduced sediment load of the river due to dam construction and sand mining, and even the changing patterns of tropical cyclones, which have until now washed more sediment into the delta to replenish it, but that could be undermined by climate change if the tracks of tropical cyclones shift north and eastwards as anticipated.[xii] It is also reported that groundwater extraction for agriculture is causing the delta to sink.[xiii] The risk to food security, local livelihoods, and national economy are significant, given that the Mekong Delta in Vietnam produces half of the country’s rice production, sixty percent of the shrimp harvest, and eighty percent of the fruit crop.[xiv] This has led some to identify the initial stages of environmental-driven migration from the Delta.[xv]

Implications for hydropower in the Lancang-Mekong basin

The construction of hydropower dams in the Lancang-Mekong basin has been controversial for decades, including whether such projects can be considered sustainable given the environmental and social impacts that typically accompany them. Climate change brings an additional dimension to this already vigorous debate. Proponents argue that hydropower dams are an appropriate mitigation strategy due to their reduced carbon emissions.[xvi] However, recent research in the Mekong Region concluded that, due to methane emissions from reservoirs “…hydropower in the Mekong Region cannot be considered categorically as low-emission energy.”[xvii] The authors add “… the GHG [Greenhouse gas] emissions of hydropower should be carefully considered case-by-case together with the other impacts on the natural and social environment.”

One fundamental question is whether more hydropower projects are needed to meet electricity demand. In Thailand, which is the main electricity market for hydropower from Laos, the peak demand was 30,853 MW in May 2019[xviii], whilst the total installed capacity as of January 2020 is 45,313 MW.[xix] Imported hydropower from Laos constitutes 3,954 MW, which Thailand’s power planners consider to contribute relatively low price and flexible capacity to Thailand’s grid for meeting peak power demands.[xx] However, comparing current electricity demand with overall capacity, Thailand has a very high reserve margin of 47 percent, which is three times a typical reserve margin of 15 percent. In China too, there is increasingly a challenge of oversupply of electricity due to the past significant investment in generation capacity and the recent shifts in structure of its economy.[xxi]

While in other countries of the region there remains electricity demand to be met in both urban and rural areas, a second question is whether there are nowadays better ways to meet this remaining demand. The current approach to meeting demand remains predominantly new supply generated by large-scale coal-fired and gas-fired power stations, or large hydropower dams. There are, however, a growing number of initiatives towards decentralized renewable electricity, energy efficiency and demand side management that are disrupting business-as-usual. These include, for example, technologies such as ‘block chain solar power’ and decentralized smart grids or microgrids, new practices such as ‘energy service companies,’ and new modes of financing.[xxii]

A third important question is how climate change will affect the operation of hydropower. The Mekong River Commission (MRC), in a recent report, suggest that under wetter climate scenarios, there would be a greater potential for hydropower generation.[xxiii] At the same time, they flag that the issue of spillway design and dam safety, which could place downstream areas at risk, still requires further assessment. This is a salient challenge in the Mekong Region, given the recent Xe Pian Xe Namnoi dam collapse in July 2018, which displaced over 6,600 people and, according to official figures left 40 people dead and 31 people missing.[xxiv] Meanwhile, extreme dry periods could reduce the dependable generation capacity of hydropower, which would require additional investment for back-up capacity; one option suggested by the MRC is floating solar PV on the reservoir surface, although this would effectively increase the cost of hydropower.

A fourth important question in the context of climate change is whether large dams might mitigate extreme flood and drought. Regarding the hydropower projects on the Lancang River[xxv] in China, in recent years there have been some ‘emergency water releases’ intended to mitigate drought.  In March 2016, for example, shortly before the region’s leaders committed to the Lancang Mekong Cooperation framework, China released water from the Lancang dams stated as a show of goodwill in an effort to alleviate the severe drought in the Lower Mekong basin at that time, although unfortunately the water releases caught some downstream communities unaware.[xxvi]

Yet, the opposite has also occurred, namely that dam operation has exacerbated drought. During the last drought (in July 2019) and the current one[xxvii], operation of the Jinghong Dam – the lowest in China’s Lancang cascade - has on occasion led to significant reductions in river water flow and abnormal fluctuations. Flow reductions were claimed to be necessary due to maintenance at the project. The MRC reported that water levels dropped on the river by up to one meter in Thailand and Laos from 27 December 2019 to 4 January 2020.[xxviii] As agreed by Memorandum of Understanding[xxix], China had sent notification via the MRC on 31 December, which stated water outflows would drop by 50 percent affecting river water levels in Thailand, Lao PDR and Cambodia[xxx]. However, these notifications often arrive to the MRC with little time to spare, and the system to disseminate the information amongst communities is still ineffective.

Acknowledging the impacts on livelihoods, the Thai Government recently publicly stated it would raise the severe impact of the drought within the MRC, including in the context of the upstream dam operation that is received with insufficient notice. This could be read as a significant rebuke given that downstream countries are typically cautious in their regional diplomacy towards China.[xxxi] Indeed, there may be a broader shifting of position, given that Thailand recently also cancelled long-standing joint plans with China for rapid’s blasting of the river’s upper stretch intended to facilitate the navigation by large trading boats.[xxxii] 

Regarding tributary hydropower projects in Laos, there is less available analysis. The MRC, however, has flagged that as most large projects being constructed are under Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts, they are locked into take-or-pay electricity contracts. As such, their potential to be operated as multi-purpose projects that could contribute to extreme flood or drought mitigation could be limited as electricity production is to be prioritized.[xxxiii]

Responses by regional institutions

The Mekong River Commission (MRC) is an intergovernmental river basin commission established by international treaty in 1995.[xxxiv] Climate change has become an increasingly significant element of its work that cumulated with the publication of a Mekong Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan (MASAP) in November 2017.[xxxv] In its State of the Basin Report 2018 (published in late 2019), the impacts of climate change are one of five critical dimensions that constitute its basin monitoring framework.[xxxvi] Various other studies have also been published relevant to climate change adaptation, including on flooding[xxxvii], the impacts of climate change on hydropower production (mentioned above) [xxxviii], and a drought management strategy published in November 2019.[xxxix] The MRC also gathers data on river flow, water quality and sediment transport that are important for understanding climate change.

Whilst these assessments and regional plans contain important analysis, and the MRC’s role is to facilitate a regional plan for adaptation to climate change, various long-standing challenges for the MRC remain. These include its ability to influence national plans, its accountability to communities and civil society, and its relationship with China that is a dialogue partner rather than full member state.

In March 2016, the region’s leaders launched the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) in Sanya City of Hainan Province, China. Two years later, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, a Five-Year Plan of Action on Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (2018-2022) was announced that signified the deepening institutionalization of the LMC. Regarding water resources, it includes commitments to inter-governmental cooperation and its institutionalization, as well as technical cooperation and joint research including on the impacts of climate change. Whilst the details are not in the public domain, there is a stated acknowledgement of the need to “Deepen Lancang-Mekong river flood and drought disaster emergency management, carry out joint assessment of flood control and drought relief in Mekong basin, and carry out joint study on the early setting up of communication line/channel for sharing information in emergency case of flood and drought in Lancang-Mekong river.” [xl]

The LMC is a new significant intergovernmental cooperation given that it brings together all six countries that share the Lancang-Mekong basin. However, it also raises challenges for transboundary water governance, including on: the extent to which crucial water data is shared; the LMC’s transparency and accountability to civil society and riparian communities; whether LMC plans for the Lancang-Mekong River adequately consider the environmental and social values of the river; and how the LMC intends to cooperate with the MRC.

On the latter point, in December 2019, the MRC Secretariat and the Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Center of the LMC signed a new MoU. Whilst it does not fully resolve underlying tensions in competing mandates and approaches between the two regional organizations, it signals an intent to cooperate on various technical areas including: data and information exchange, basin monitoring, and joint assessment and study.[xli]

A first step will be to “to conduct a joint research on the 2019 drought and low flow situation in the Mekong River basin… to be completed by September 2020.”[xlii] This is clearly a significant study. However, in the context of the past impacts of China’s dam operation on Northern Thailand impacting farmers and fishers it is also likely to be a contentious one. During the 2019 drought, a public dispute broke out between representatives of the Chinese Embassy in Bangkok[xliii] and civil society groups in Northern Thailand[xliv] over the role of China’s dams in the drought.[xlv] Given these already existing tensions a transparent and accountable study would be imperative that is inclusive of community concerns in terms of both process and final publication. [xlvi]

Meeting the challenge of climate change

A healthy Lancang-Mekong River is central to maintaining livelihoods, but the river is under stress due to existing challenges in the basin that are increasingly intersecting with climate change. The challenges in the basin and the solutions are to-a-degree technical, but are fundamentally a question of national and regional politics including regarding the competing roles, mandates and authorities of the MRC and LMC, as well as the space for decentralized decision-making and local communities voice.

Whilst recently there have been important steps towards improved water data sharing, more remains to be done. In February 2020, a new program of the MRC called the Joint Environmental Monitoring held its inception workshop that is designed to monitor transboundary environmental impacts from the two recently-commissioned mainstream dam projects in Laos.[xlvii] Meanwhile, as detailed above, the MRC and LMC are undertaking a joint study that may improve data sharing on China’s Lancang dams, although this is not guaranteed. The major gap in regional data sharing at present is dam operation for tributary projects. If meaningfully implemented, better data sharing would facilitate improved advanced warning for droughts and floods, and more accountable basin planning, but only if there is the political will to act on the data.

There are a range of further steps that should be taken including: the need to assess the risks of existing large dams to modified river conditions due to climate change; to consider how existing hydropower projects’ contracts can be rewritten to become multi-purpose schemes; and to explore alternative future electricity scenarios utilizing technologies other than hydropower.

More fundamentally, there is the opportunity to take a more holistic and transformative approach towards managing severe drought and flood through adopting a basin-wide perspective on nature-based solutions, as discussed by UNESCO in the United Nations World Water Development Report 2018[xlviii], and increasing support for community preparedness and culturally appropriate adaptation. The present emphasis on large infrastructure-led approaches to manage severe droughts and floods is already, as evidenced in practiced, revealing its limitations; indeed a ‘control approach’ towards nature has been increasingly critiqued and more flexible approaches that adapt to nature encouraged.[xlix] In the nature-based approach, UNESCO emphasize conserving or rehabilitating natural ecosystems to enhance the storage, quality and availability of water at scales ranging from the micro- to macro, including, for example, forest and wetlands. Necessarily, within such an approach, local community leadership and wider community involvement is central. Meanwhile, enabling in an inclusive, participatory and culturally appropriate way community preparedness and adaptation strategies is important, including effective provision of emergency relief and supporting alternative ways of making a living during periods of severe drought.

———

[i] Director, Center of Excellence in Resource Politics for Social Development, Center for Social Development Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. Email: Carl.Chulalongkorn@gmail.com

[ii] MRC (2019) “Mekong water levels reach low record” 18 July 2019 http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mekong-water-levels-reach-low-record/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[iii] MRC (2019) “Drought continues to hit Mekong countries, risking stress on crop production, water shortages” 19 Nov 2019 http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/drought-continues-to-hit-mekong-countries-risking-stress-on-crop-production-water-shortage/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[iv] Lovgren, S. (2020) “Southeast Asia’s most critical river is entering uncharted waters” 31 Jan 2020 https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/01/southeast-asia-most-critical-river-enters-uncharted-waters/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[v] e.g see Evers, J. and A. Pathirana (2018). "Adaptation to climate change in the Mekong River Basin: introduction to the special issue." Climatic Change 149(1): 1-11.

[vi] WLE Greater Mekong (n.d.) “Mekong Dams Observatory” https://wle-mekong.cgiar.org/changes/our-research/greater-mekong-dams-observatory/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]; Middleton, C. and J. Allouche (2016). "Watershed or Powershed?: A critical hydropolitics of the ‘Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Framework." The International Spectator 51(3): 100-117.

[vii] UN-Water (n.d.) “Water and Climate Change” https://www.unwater.org/water-facts/climate-change/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[viii] MRC (n.d.) “Climate Change” http://www.mrcmekong.org/topics/climate-change/ [Last accessed 11.2.20] and MRC (2019) “State of the Basin Report 2018”

[ix] MRC (2019) “Mekong water related resources need urgent protection, better planning and management, says a new MRC report” 22 Oct 2019 http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mekong-water-related-resources-need-urgent-protection-better-planning-and-management-says-a-new-mrc-report/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[x] WWF (n.d.) “Climate Change” http://greatermekong.panda.org/challenges_in_the_greater_mekong/climate_change_in_the_greater_mekong/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xi] MRC (2019) “The Council Study: Study on Sustainable Management and Development of the Mekong River including Impacts of Mainstream Hydropower Projects” http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/Council-Study/Key-findings-of-the-Council-Study_26-Nov-18_Revised-4-Jan-19.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]  

[xii] McSweeny, R. (2016) “Shifting tropical cyclones increases threat to sinking Mekong delta” https://www.carbonbrief.org/shifting-tropical-cyclones-increases-threat-to-sinking-mekong-delta [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020] and Darby, S. E. et al. (2016) Fluvial sediment supply to a mega-delta reduced by shifting tropical-cyclone activity, Nature, doi:10.1038/nature19809

[xiii] Fawthrop, T. (2019) “Dams and climate change are killing the Mekong River” 28 Nov 2019

https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/dams-and-climate-change-are-killing-mekong-river [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xiv] Warner, K., et al (2009) “In search of Shelter: Mapping the effects of climate change on human migration and displacement.” A policy paper prepared for the 2009 Climate Negotiations. Bonn, Germany: United Nations University, CARE, and CIESIN, Columbia University and in close collaboration with the European Commission “Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project”, the UNHCR, and the World Bank.

[xv] Dun, O. (2011). "Migration and Displacement Triggered by Floods in the Mekong Delta." International Migration 49(S1): 200-222; and Chapman, A. and Tri, V.P.D. (2018) “How climate change is triggering a migrant crisis in Vietnam” 25 Jan 2018 https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change-vietnam-migration-crisis-poverty-global-warming-mekong-delta-a8153626.html [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xvi] See IHA (n.d.) “Greenhouse gas emissions” https://www.hydropower.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xvii] Räsänen, T.A. et al (2018) "Greenhouse gas emissions of hydropower in the Mekong River Basin" Environ. Res. Lett. 13 034030 https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aaa817

[xviii] EPPO (n.d.) Electricity statistics http://www.eppo.go.th/index.php/en/en-energystatistics/electricity-statistic?orders[publishUp]=publishUp&issearch=1 [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xix] EGAT (n.d.) “System Installed Generating Capacity: Jan 2020” https://www.egat.co.th/en/information/statistical-data?view=article&layout=edit&id=80 [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xx] EPPO (2016) Power Purchased from Laos PDR (posted on 29 March 2016) http://www.eppo.go.th/index.php/en/energy-information-services/power-purchased-from-laos-pdr; and EGAT (2020) “System Installed Generating Capacity” (as of January 2020). https://www.egat.co.th/en/information/statistical-data?view=article&id=80 [Last accessed 9 March 2020]

[xxi] Magee, D. and Hennig, T. (2017) “Hydropower boom in China and along Asia’s rivers outpaces regional electricity demand” 28 April 2017. https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2017/04/28/hydropower-boom-in-china-and-along-asias-rivers-outpaces-regional-electricity-demand/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxii] Hong, C-S. (2019) “Thailand’s Renewable Energy Transitions: A Pathway to Realize Thailand 4.0” 9 March 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/thailands-renewable-energy-transitions-a-pathway-to-realize-thailand-4-0/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020] and UNESCAP (2018) Energy Transition Pathways for 2030 Agenda for Asia and the Pacific: Regional Trends Report on Energy for Sustainable Development 2018

[xxiii] MRC (2018) “Basin-Wide Assessment of Climate Change Impacts on Hydropower Production” http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/Basin-wide-Assessment-of-Climate-Change-Impacts-on-Hydropower-Production_report-13May19.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxiv] RFA (2019) “Laos Pays Compensation to Families of Dead and Missing in PNPC Dam Disaster” 29 Jan 2019. https://reliefweb.int/report/lao-peoples-democratic-republic/laos-pays-compensation-families-dead-and-missing-pnpc-dam [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxv] The Lancang River is the name in China of the upper stretch of the Mekong River

[xxvi] Middleton, C. and J. Allouche (2016). "Watershed or Powershed?: A critical hydropolitics of the ‘Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Framework." The International Spectator 51(3): 100-117.

[xxvii] MRC (2019) “Mekong water levels to drop due to dam equipment testing in China” 31 Dec 2019 http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mekong-water-levels-to-drop-due-to-dam-equipment-testing-in-china/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxviii] MRC (2020) “Weekly Dry Season Situation Report for the Mekong River Basin Prepared on: 07/01/2020, covering the week from 31 Dec 2019 to 5 Jan 2020” https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2020-01-06%20Weekly%20Dry%20Season%20Situation.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxix] MRC (2019) “MRC and China renew pact on water data provision and other cooperation initiatives” http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mrc-and-china-renew-pact-on-water-data-provision-and-other-cooperation-initiatives/ [Last accessed 9 March 2020]

[xxx]  MRC (2019) “Mekong water levels to drop due to dam equipment testing in China” 31 Dec 2019 http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mekong-water-levels-to-drop-due-to-dam-equipment-testing-in-china/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxxi] Sivasomboon, B. and Phaicharoen, N. (2020) “Thailand to Air Concerns with River Commission over Drought, Chinese Dams in Mekong” https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/thailand-china-01142020183829.html [Last accessed on 23 Feb 2020]

[xxxii] Zhou, L. (2020) “Thailand nixed China’s Mekong River blasting project. Will others push back?” https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3051812/thailand-nixed-chinas-mekong-river-blasting-project-will [Last accessed 9 March 2020]

[xxxiii] Kijewski, L. (2019) “Experts doubt effectiveness of new plan to address Mekong drought” 26 Dec 2019 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/experts-doubt-effectiveness-plan-address-mekong-drought-191225010811086.html/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxxiv] MRC (1995). Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, 5 April 1995 http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/policies/agreement-Apr95.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxxv] MRC (2017) “Mekong Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan” http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/MASAP-book-28-Aug18.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxxvi] MRC (2019) “State of the Basin Report 2018” http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/SOBR-v8_Final-for-web.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxxvii] MRC (2019) “Enhancement of Basin-wide Flood Analysis and Additional Simulations under Climate Change for Impact Assessment and MASAP Preparation” http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/Enhancement-of-Basin-wide-Flood-Analysis-27June19.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]                                                  

[xxxviii] MRC (2018) “Basin-Wide Assessment of Climate Change Impacts on Hydropower Production” http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/Basin-wide-Assessment-of-Climate-Change-Impacts-on-Hydropower-Production_report-13May19.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxxix] MRC (2019) “Drought Management Strategy for the Lower Mekong Basin 2020-2025” http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/MRC-DMS-2020-2025-Fourth-draft-V3.0-formatted.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xl] LMC (2018) “Five-Year Plan of Action on Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (2018-2022)” https://pressocm.gov.kh/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ENG-Five-Year-Plan-of-Action-on-Lancang-Mekong-Cooperation-2018-2022.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xli] MRC (2019) “MRC Secretariat, LMC Water Center ink first MOU for better upper-lower Mekong management” 18 Dec 2019 http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mrc-secretariat-lmc-water-center-ink-first-mou-for-better-upper-lower-mekong-management/  [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xlii] MRC (2019) “Mekong water levels to drop due to dam equipment testing in China” 31 Dec 2019 http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mekong-water-levels-to-drop-due-to-dam-equipment-testing-in-china/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xliii] Yang Yang “False report undermines Mekong cooperation” Bangkok Post 12.7.19 https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1711051/false-report-undermines-mekong-cooperation [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xliv] Roykaew, N. (2019) “Opinion: China must be sincere on the Mekong” 17 July 2019 Bangkok Post https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1713756/china-must-be-sincere-on-mekong [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xlv] Sunchindah, A. “Mekong dilemmas need political will to resolve” 26.7.19 https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1719067/mekong-dilemmas-need-political-will-to-resolve [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xlvi] Bainbridge, A. (2020) “China's Mekong River dams are generating renewable energy, but are costing locals their livelihoods” 20 Jan 2020 https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-01-20/china-mekong-river-plan-creates-renewable-energy-but-costs-jobs/11872640 [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]; Wongcha-um, P. “Missing Mekong waters rouse suspicions of China” Reuters 25.7.19 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mekong-river/missing-mekong-waters-rouse-suspicions-of-china-idUSKCN1UK19Q?fbclid=IwAR2cMyWj9qSwVRAs7lABnzI7oaD1oCvyjD5TSDcDkWf3CJwDqcU46GY7lUs [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xlvii] MRC (2020) “Pilot program to monitor impacts from Xayaburi and Don Sahong takes off” http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/pilot-program-to-monitor-impacts-from-xayaburi-and-don-sahong-takes-off/ [Last accessed 9 March 2020]

[xlviii] UNESCO (2018) “Nature Based Solutions for Water: The United Nations World Water Development Report 2018”

[xlix] Allouche, J., Middleton C. and Gyawali, D. (2019). The Water-Food-Energy Nexus: Power, Politics and Justice Routledge-Earthscan: London and New York

JOURNAL ARTICLE: How Transboundary Processes Connect Commons in Japan and Thailand: A Relational Analysis of Global Commodity Chains and East Asian Economic Integration

Publication date: February 2020

Publication: Asia Pacific Viewpoint

Authors: Carl Middleton, Takeshi Ito

Abstract:

In this paper, with a focus on Japan and Thailand, we outline a relational environmental and economic history of East Asian economic integration (EAEI) and its implication for the commons in both places. We draw attention in particular to global commodity chains as relational processes not only of trade and investment, but also geopolitics and aid, to argue that these transborder processes have connected together commons in distant localities resulting in their simultaneous enclosure, dispossession and (re-)commoning with implications for community vulnerabilities in positive and negative ways. To demonstrate this argument we analyse three periods of EAEI: the late nineteenth century until World War II, when Japan and Thailand both began to modernise and new trade and geopolitical relations emerged in the context of colonialism; the post-World War II recovery until the Plaza Accord in 1986, during which time Japan rapidly industrialised, as did Thailand to a lesser extent and regionalism was largely defined by US hegemony; and the post-Plaza Accord period, when Japan deindustrialised its labour intensive manufacture and heavy industry and Thailand rapidly industrialised and EAEI became defined by new and intensified global commodity chains.

Keywords: (re-)commoning, dispossession, enclosure, environment–society relations

See the article here.

Citation: Middleton, C., & Ito, T. (2020). How transboundary processes connect commons in Japan and Thailand: A relational analysis of global commodity chains and East Asian economic integration. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 61(2), 236–248. https://doi.org/10.1111/apv.12264

JOURNAL ARTICLE: Ontological Politics of Hydrosocial Territories in the Salween River Basin, Myanmar/Burma

Publication date: April 2020

Publication: Political Geography, Volume 78

Authors: Johanna M. Götz, Carl Middleton

Abstract:

In this paper, we question an often-unchallenged assumption that we all talk about the same ‘thing’ when talking about water. Taking the Salween River in Myanmar as a case study, we draw on a growing body of hydrosocial literature to analyze the multiple ontologies of water. Conceptually, we take each ontology to be constituted of – and enacted within – a human-more-than-human assemblage, the spatiotemporal dimensions of which demarcate a ‘hydrosocial territory.’ We present three illustrations, namely: the role of the Union Government's National Water Resources Committee and how it manifests and is situated within an ontology of ‘modern Water’; a Karen indigenous initiative to establish a Salween Peace Park and an associated revealing of an ‘indigenous’ ontology; and plans for the construction of mainstream hydropower dams and electricity export to neighboring Thailand, where different water ontologies and their hydrosocial territories collide. We examine how multiple ontologies of water are contested through ‘ontological politics’, whereby human actors compete to further their own interests by naturalizing their ontology while marginalizing others. While not downplaying the role violent conflict plays, we argue that in the Salween basin ontological politics are an underappreciated terrain of contestation through which political authority and the power relations that underpin it are (re)produced, with implications for processes of state formation, territorialization and the ongoing peace negotiations.

Key Words: Salween/Thanlwin River, Resource politics, Multiple ontologies of water, Partially-connected worlds

Read the article here.

Citation: Götz, J. M., & Middleton, C. (2020). Ontological politics of hydrosocial territories in the Salween River basin, Myanmar/Burma. Political Geography, 78, 102115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102115

TEACHING MANUAL: KNOTS Project | Third Section - Topics, Themes and Application

The teaching manual is the main outcome of the KNOTS project. It is a resource as well as a toolbox for university teachers, researchers, students and interested audiences  With the manual, we want not only to motivate colleagues all over the world to take up transdisciplinarity in teaching but also to give some ideas and guidelines on how to do it in practice based on our shared experiences and endeavors.

For more background information about the teaching manual, please visit the link here.

Third Section - Topics, Themes and Application

Transdisciplinarity and Migration Studies

This session elaborates on the possible ways to approach migration studies from a transdisciplinary perspective. Transdisciplinary migration research is underrepresented in transdisciplinary scholarship compared to other fields of scholarly inquiry such as urban planning, natural resources management, or public health. It is also less prone to collaborative research practice such as action research, or collaborating with social movements or social groups from civil society. At the same time, the migration question is also closely related to identification and othering processes, and hence also about identity politics. Because of this, its analysis is often messy and ambiguous. From a transdisciplinary point of view, discussing the political interests and the discriminatory and exclusionary social practices which make migration a problem should become more central to migration studies than they usually are. We thus argue that such a shifting of focus in migration studies, which could be achieved by pursuing a transdisciplinary approach, would help to understand more closely the intersection of societal, political and economic powers constituting the migration subject. 

Transdisciplinary research in environmental change: A political ecology approach 

The aim of this session is three-fold: 1) To problematize the relationship between environment and society to reveal their fundamental interdependence. Here, it is also emphasized how knowledge production shapes the co-produced relationship between environment and society and its governance. 2) To highlight the inherently political nature of environment-society relations, drawing on the field of political ecology and its key themes: scarcity, ecological modernization, the market and processes of commodification, and the commons. 3) To explore examples of transdisciplinary research in relation to real-world challenges of environmental change.

Environment and Social Movement in South East Asia

This section contains an example of a 4,5 hour teaching session on transdisciplinarity in the context of “Environment and Social Movement in South East Asia”. The session, developed by Ta-Wei Chu from Chiang Mai University, is divided in three parts: “Introduction to Transdisciplinarity”, “Knowledge Production and Integration”, and “Transdisciplinary Environmental Research”.

Student Working Papers

This section is not a part of the teaching manual, but concerns related students’ reflections on transdisciplinary work (with a particular focus on KNOTS). Two working papers were produced in this respect.

Go to First Section - What is Trandisciplinarity?

Go to Second Section - Methodologies and Research Design

Please click here to visit KNOTS’ CSDS Project Page

TEACHING MANUAL: KNOTS Project | Second Section - Methodologies and Research Designs

The teaching manual is the main outcome of the KNOTS project. It is a resource as well as a toolbox for university teachers, researchers, students and interested audiences  With the manual, we want not only to motivate colleagues all over the world to take up transdisciplinarity in teaching but also to give some ideas and guidelines on how to do it in practice based on our shared experiences and endeavors.

For more background information about the teaching manual, please visit the link here.

Second Section - Methodologies and Research Designs

Methodologies for Transdisciplinarity

Transdisciplinary research practice challenges in its core two intrinsic assumptions of academic knowledge production: first, that scientific knowledge is neutral and objective, and second, that science is on top of the hierarchy between different sorts of knowledges. This session introduces thoughts from postcolonial and feminist authors who address science as relations of power and domination, but which are conspicuously missing in transdisciplinary literature. This session therefore introduces the concepts of othering, epistemic violence and colonizing discourse,as well as situated knowledges and standpoint theory. It further proposes reflexive positionality as a strategy to navigate through research and the pitfalls of producing knowledge within multiple societal hierarchies.   

Participation and Local Knowledge

The general purpose of this lecture is to introduce participation and local knowledge in a combined way and explicitly link the two topics. The specific aim related to participation is to show that participation goes beyond mere communicative aspects and involves a political dimension. The specific aim related to local knowledge is to explain that general attributes of local knowledge make it a specific kind of knowledge found in all societies. 

Knowledge Co-Production and Integrative Design

This session begins by discussing different types of knowledge and their multiple rationalities. It then deliberates why a disconnect exists between ‘real-world’ problems and knowledge produced through academic research projects, and it introduces ‘knowledge co-production’ to link them together (van Kerkhoff and Lebel, 2006). A methodology for transdisciplinary research developed by the Institute for Socio-Ecological Research (ISOE) is presented to exemplify how transdisciplinary research may be undertaken in practice (Bergmann et al 2012). This session concludes with a role-play exercise that explores the first stage of transdisciplinary research, namely problem definition and research question preparation.

Transdisciplinarity and Intersectionality

In this session, there will be five parts: (1) a short discussion of the similarities between the concepts intersectionality and transdisciplinarity, followed by (2) an introduction into intersectionality, and then (3) what it means to apply this concept methodologically. Finally, (4) it will be highlighted how to apply intersectionality in a transdisciplinary project, before (5) the conclusion of the lecture. 

Ethical issues in the context of transdisciplinary research

This session will (1) introduce the historical roots of attending to the ethical aspects of human related research, (2) sum up the institutional context of research ethics as embodied in institutional ethical guidelines, (3) focus on the concepts of positionality and reflexivity and finally (4) discuss assessing ethics in the 3 stages of TDR projects.

Go to First Section - What is Trandisciplinarity?

Go to Third Section - Topics, Themes and Application

Please click here to visit KNOTS’ CSDS Project Page

TEACHING MANUAL: KNOTS Project | First Section - What is Trandisciplinarity?

The teaching manual is the main outcome of the KNOTS project. It is a resource as well as a toolbox for university teachers, researchers, students and interested audiences  With the manual, we want not only to motivate colleagues all over the world to take up transdisciplinarity in teaching but also to give some ideas and guidelines on how to do it in practice based on our shared experiences and endeavors.

For more background information about the teaching manual, please visit the link here.

First Section - What is Trandisciplinarity?

The History of Transdisciplinarity

This session a) provides a brief historical perspective on transdisciplinarity, b) discusses different forms of integrative knowledge production like interdisciplinarity, multidisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity, and c) introduces the two most common understandings of transdisciplinarity and common features. 

Why Transdisciplinarity?

This session gives a short overview over 1) the history of science, thereby introducing the differentiation of science in disciplines, the differentiation between scientific and practical knowledge and the fragmentation of different types of methods, forms and norms (i.e. paradigms); and 2) how these debates and discussions relate to the discussions on science communication and whether and how this can help us to understand the possibilities and relevance of transdisciplinarity as a new framework for knowledge production.

How to Do Transdisciplinary Research?

This session focusses on how to do transdisciplinary research. Thereby the second understanding of transdisciplinarity which sees it as an operational modus of research connecting knowledge production and societal problems (see session “The History of Transdisciplinarity”) is in the center of interest. This presentation will a) introduce the ‘ideal’ phases of a transdisciplinary research project, b) discuss the challenges and c) lay out strategies presented for to coping with challenges that might accompany the implementation of transdisciplinary projects. Therefore, it is important to keep in mind that the focus is on researchers and their perspectives. 

Go to Second Section - Methodologies and Research Design

Go to Third Section - Topics, Themes and Application

Please click here to visit KNOTS’ CSDS Project Page

BOOK CHAPTER: A State of Knowledge of the Salween River: An Overview of Civil Society Research

Publication date:
August 2019

Publication:
Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River

Chapter Title:
A State of Knowledge of the Salween River: An Overview of Civil Society Research

Authors:
Vanessa Lamb, Carl Middleton, Saw John Bright, Saw Tha Phoe, Naw Aye Aye Myaing, Nang Hom Kham, Sai Aum Khay, Nang Sam Paung Hom, Nang Aye Tin, Nang Shining, Yu Xiaogang, Chen Xiangxue, Chayan Vaddhanaphuti

Editors:
Carl Middleton and Vanessa Lamb

You can access the chapter here.

For further details on the book and to purchase, please visit Springer.

For more information about our project Salween Water Governance, please visit here.

This chapter presents an overview of civil society research on Salween, providing an overview of the existing knowledge of the basin and a start to identifying key knowledge gaps in support of more informed, inclusive, and accountable water governance in the basin.

Please contact Dr. Carl Middleton for more information.

Citation: Lamb, V., Middleton, C., Saw John Bright, Saw Tha Phoe, Naw Aye Aye Myaing, Nang Hom Kham, Sai Aum Khay, Nang Sam Paung Hom, Nang Aye Tin, Nang Shining, Yu, X., Chen, X. and Vaddhanaphuti, C. (2019) “A State of Knowledge of the Salween River: An Overview of Civil Society Research” (pp 107-120) in Middleton, C. and Lamb, V. (eds.) Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

BOOK CHAPTER: From Hydropower Construction to National Park Creation: Changing Pathways of the Nu River

Publication date:
August 2019

Publication:
Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River

Chapter Title:
From Hydropower Construction to National Park Creation: Changing Pathways of the Nu River

Authors:
Yu Xiaogang, Chen Xiangxue, Carl Middleton

Editors:
Carl Middleton and Vanessa Lamb

You can access the chapter here.

For further details on the book and to purchase, please visit Springer.

For more information about our project Salween Water Governance, please visit here.

This chapter explores the range of visions for the Nu River and the extent to which they have materialized through exploring five ‘pathways’, namely: The hydropower construction pathway; the civil society river protection pathway; the energy reform pathway; the national park pathway; and the water conservancy pathway.

Please contact Dr. Carl Middleton for more information.

Citation: Yu, X., Chen, X., and Middleton, C. (2019) “From Hydropower Construction to National Park Creation: Changing Pathways of the Nu River” (pp 49-70) in Middleton, C. and Lamb, V. (eds.) Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River. Cham, Switzerland: Springer

BOOK CHAPTER: Hydropower Politics and Conflict on the Salween River

Publication date:
August 2019

Publication:
Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River

Chapter Title:
Hydropower Politics and Conflict on the Salween River

Authors:
Carl Middleton, Alec Scott and Vanessa Lamb

Editors:
Carl Middleton and Vanessa Lamb

You can access the chapter here.

For further details on the book and to purchase, please visit Springer.

For more information about our project Salween Water Governance, please visit here.

This chapter examines the hydropower politics of the Salween River, with a focus on the projects proposed in Myanmar and their connections with neighboring China and Thailand via electricity trade, investment, and regional geopolitics.

Please contact Dr. Carl Middleton for more information.

Citation: Middleton, C., Scott, A. and Lamb, V. (2019) “Chapter 3: Hydropower Politics and Conflict on the Salween River” (pp 27-48) in Middleton, C. and Lamb, V. (eds.) Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River. Cham, Switzerland: Springer

BOOK CHAPTER: Introduction: Resources Politics and Knowing the Salween River

Publication date:
August 2019

Publication:
Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River

Chapter Title:
Introduction: Resources Politics and Knowing the Salween River

Authors:
Vanessa Lamb, Carl Middleton, and Saw Win

Editors:
Carl Middleton and Vanessa Lamb

You can access the chapter here.

For further details on the book and to purchase, please visit Springer.

For more information about our project Salween Water Governance, please visit here.

This chapter provides an overview of key arguments and concepts of the edited volume across three themes: resource politics, politics of making knowledge, and reconciling knowledge across divides.

Please contact Dr. Carl Middleton for more information.

Citation: Lamb, V., Middleton, C. and Saw Win (2019) “Introduction: Resources Politics and Knowing the Salween River” (pp 1-16) in Middleton, C. and Lamb, V. (eds.) Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River. Cham, Switzerland: Springer