REPORT: Contested Knowledges of the Commons in Southeast Asia Research Progress report - Vignettes from the Field (CRISEA Working Paper 2)

Publication date:
March 2020

Publication:
Contested Knowledges of the Commons in Southeast Asia Research Progress report - Vignettes from the Field

Edited and compiled:
Carl Middleton

Authors:
Monika Arnez, Sally Beckenham, David Chu, Robert A. Farnan, Tomasz Kamiński, Carl Middleton, Edyta Roszko, Thianchai Surimas, Amnuayvit Thitibordin, Andrea Valente, Michał Zaręba

Download the report here.

Historically until the present day, wide-ranging forms, scopes, intensities and durations of resource politics have shaped the concept and practice of development across Southeast Asia. In this report, we present eight vignettes that offer a sample of some of the varying characteristics of these resource politics and their implications for competition over resources and the commons, and social justice. The vignettes are the interim products of multidisciplinary research – and in one case transdisciplinary research - that is ongoing by team members of ‘Work Package 1 on the Environment’ of the EU-funded project Competing Regional Integrations in Southeast Asia (CRISEA).[1] 

In our first Working Paper, published in March 2019, we detailed our Work Package’s theoretical framework.[2] The core of the shared conceptual approach of our research is an examination of the co-production of ecological knowledge and ecological governance, viewed across the global, national and local scales. Here we draw upon the foundational work of Sheila Jasanoff (2004)[3], and as applied in Southeast Asia more recently by Gururani and Vandergeest (2014)[4] amongst others, to understand the remaking of nature-society relations in Southeast Asia. In short, as stated by Jasanoff (2004:2) “… co-production is shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it”. The co-production of natural and social orders are thus mediated by the production, circulation, integration and dissemination of knowledge, which itself must be contextualized to historical context, power relations, and culture.

The purpose of this Working Paper is to offer empirically grounded case studies of resource politics in practice in the region, as a work-in-progress. Overall, the research projects address three overarching themes: Transition into a low-carbon economy (Kamiński); Sea (Arnez; Roszko); and Rivers (Beckenham and Farnan; Chu; Middleton and Surimas; Thitibordin; Zaręba). We seek to analyze these cases through our project’s conceptual lens to generate both academic insight and policy-relevant recommendations, which will be the subject of forthcoming publications.

Please contact Dr. Carl Middleton for more information.

Citation: Arnez, M., Beckenham, S., Chu, D., Farnan, R.A., Kamiński, T., Middleton, C., Roszko, E., Surimas, T., Valente, A., and Zaręba, M. (2020) The Environment - Contested Knowledge of the Commons in Southeast Asia (CRISEA Working Paper 2). Research Progress report - Vignettes from the Field (CRISEA) Working Paper No. 2 (March 2020).

This report is part of our project The Contested Meanings of the Mekong River in Northern Thailand. You can visit the project page here.

——

[1] See http://crisea.eu/ for further details

[2] Kamiński, T., Arnez, M., Middleton, C., Beckenham, S., Farnan, R.A., Chu, D., Roszko, E., Thitibordin, A., Valente, A., and Zaręba, M. (2019) The Environment - Contested Knowledge of the Commons in Southeast Asia (CRISEA Working Paper 1). Competing Regional Integrations in Southeast Asia (CRISEA) Working Paper No. 1 (March 2019).

[3] Jasanoff, S. (2004). States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order. London: Routledge

[4] Gururani, S. & P. Vandergeest (2014). ‘Introduction: New Frontiers of Ecological Knowledge: Co-producing Knowledge and Governance in Asia.’ Conservation and Society 12(4): 343-351.

ธรรมชาติเชิงวิพากษ์: การจัดการภัยแล้งและการเปลี่ยนแปลงสภาพภูมิอากาศในแม่น้ำล้านช้าง-แม่โขง โดยแนวทางใหม่บนพื้นฐานธรรมชาติ

เรื่องโดย คาร์ล มิดเดิลตัน*

[English version available here]

MEKONG RIVER (c) CARL MIDDLETON

ปัจจุบันภูมิภาคลุ่มแม่น้ำโขงกำลังเผชิญกับภัยแล้งอย่างรุนแรง แม้ว่าเหลืออีกเพียง 3 เดือนจะเข้าสู่ฤดูฝนแต่ระดับน้ำในลุ่มแม่น้ำล้านช้าง-แม่โขงกลับลดระดับลงต่ำจนสันดอนทรายและโขดหินโผล่ออกมาอย่างเห็นได้ชัดเจนตลอดตามแนวแม่น้ำ ภัยแล้งได้ทำให้เกิดผลกระทบและความเสี่ยงต่อระบบนิเวศ การประมงและการเกษตร ความมั่นคงทางอาหาร วิถีการดำเนินชีวิตและแม้แต่การจัดหาน้ำเพื่อการอุปโภคบริโภค สำหรับผู้คนนับล้านที่วิถีชีวิตต้องพึ่งพาทรัพยากรจากแม่น้ำนั้นภัยแล้งคือมหันตภัยที่ก่อให้เกิดความยากลำบากในชีวิตอย่างรุนแรงผนวกกับการระบาดของเชื้อไวรัสโควิด-19 ที่กำลังเกิดขึ้นอยู่นี้ทำให้เพิ่มความท้าทายในการดำเนินชีวิตของพวกเขามากขึ้น

คลิ๊กที่นี่เพื่อดาวน์โหลดเอกสารฉบับเต็มในรูปแบบ PDF

*สังกัด: ศูนย์เชี่ยวชาญเฉพาะทางด้านการเมืองทรัพยากรเพื่อการพัฒนาสังคม, ศูนย์ศึกษาเพื่อการพัฒนาสังคม คณะรัฐศาสตร์ จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย

CRITICAL NATURE: Addressing Drought and Climate Change on the Lancang-Mekong River Needs New and Nature-based Solutions

By Carl Middleton[i]

[Thai version available here]

Mekong River Carl Middleton

Introduction

The Mekong Region is currently facing a serious drought. Despite there being possibly three months until the next rainy season, the Lancang-Mekong River is already extremely low, with sand bars and rocky outcrops exposed along many stretches of the river. The drought places at risk ecosystems, fishing and farming livelihoods, wider food security, and even drinking water supply. For the millions whose livelihoods depend upon the river’s resources, the drought is creating severe hardship - compounded now further by the COVID-19 pandemic. 

The current drought is in fact the continuation of last year’s drought, which was already the worst in living memory.[ii] The delayed monsoon finally arrived in July, but then finished early and failed to fully replenish water sources. The drought’s intensity is further amplified by the El Niño weather pattern, which has raised temperatures and rates of evapotranspiration.[iii] The extent to which climate change is nowadays acting upon the basin is also an increasingly debated question[iv], and the subject of a growing number of studies.[v]

It has also been vigorously debated whether large dam infrastructure in the basin has exacerbated the impact of the drought, or could have been operated differently to better mitigate its impacts. A particular focus has been on the upstream dams in China, where eleven projects have been progressively built on the Lancang (upper-Mekong) River mainstream since the early 1990s.  This is because a significant proportion of the river’s dry-season flow originates from China, from the glacial melt of the river’s headwaters in the Tibetan Plateau, and more recently due to the significant reservoir storage now in place.

As the impacts of climate change deepen, severe drought threatens to become a part of the ‘new normal.’ The challenge of equitably ensuring water, food and energy security for all underscores the importance of improving - and rethinking - water governance and drought adaptation in the basin in the context of climate change.

Anticipated impacts of climate change

The Lancang-Mekong River is one of the world’s major river basins, and is second only to the Amazon in terms of biodiversity. Measuring 4,800 kilometers along the mainstem, it traverses China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. 72 million people live within the basin, and for a majority access to river resources remain central to livelihoods.  The river was largely free-flowing until the early 1990s, but nowadays it’s seasonal cycle of monsoon flooding and dry-season low flows are shaped by extensive hydropower dam operation.[vi]

According to UN-Water, “Water is the primary medium through which we will feel the effects of climate change.”[vii] In the Mekong region, anticipated and already occurring changes to the climate and hydrology, as well as sea-level rise, are increasingly center to public debates and policy concerns. Whilst there is always uncertainty in making predictions on climate change, the best available analysis anticipates weather change including a mean temperature rise of 0.2 oC per decade, a regional increase in annual precipitation of 200 mm, more regular severe floods and droughts, and greater seasonal uncertainty. Meanwhile, sea level rise will increasingly threaten the low-lying delta area.[viii]

Climate change trends, however, need to be considered in the context of existing challenges within the basin. These include the changing flow regime and reduced sediment loads due to extensive dam construction, loss of wetlands and degrading riverine ecosystems, and weaknesses in transboundary water governance including incomplete water data sharing and the accountability of river-related decision-making – especially related to large hydropower dams [ix]. Climate change will intersect with and amplify these challenges[x], posing risks to terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, agriculture and fisheries, livelihoods and food security, as well as national economic growth, especially under drier climate scenarios.[xi]

For example, the delta area in Vietnam is at risk from sea-level rise, a risk that is further heightened by the reduced sediment load of the river due to dam construction and sand mining, and even the changing patterns of tropical cyclones, which have until now washed more sediment into the delta to replenish it, but that could be undermined by climate change if the tracks of tropical cyclones shift north and eastwards as anticipated.[xii] It is also reported that groundwater extraction for agriculture is causing the delta to sink.[xiii] The risk to food security, local livelihoods, and national economy are significant, given that the Mekong Delta in Vietnam produces half of the country’s rice production, sixty percent of the shrimp harvest, and eighty percent of the fruit crop.[xiv] This has led some to identify the initial stages of environmental-driven migration from the Delta.[xv]

Implications for hydropower in the Lancang-Mekong basin

The construction of hydropower dams in the Lancang-Mekong basin has been controversial for decades, including whether such projects can be considered sustainable given the environmental and social impacts that typically accompany them. Climate change brings an additional dimension to this already vigorous debate. Proponents argue that hydropower dams are an appropriate mitigation strategy due to their reduced carbon emissions.[xvi] However, recent research in the Mekong Region concluded that, due to methane emissions from reservoirs “…hydropower in the Mekong Region cannot be considered categorically as low-emission energy.”[xvii] The authors add “… the GHG [Greenhouse gas] emissions of hydropower should be carefully considered case-by-case together with the other impacts on the natural and social environment.”

One fundamental question is whether more hydropower projects are needed to meet electricity demand. In Thailand, which is the main electricity market for hydropower from Laos, the peak demand was 30,853 MW in May 2019[xviii], whilst the total installed capacity as of January 2020 is 45,313 MW.[xix] Imported hydropower from Laos constitutes 3,954 MW, which Thailand’s power planners consider to contribute relatively low price and flexible capacity to Thailand’s grid for meeting peak power demands.[xx] However, comparing current electricity demand with overall capacity, Thailand has a very high reserve margin of 47 percent, which is three times a typical reserve margin of 15 percent. In China too, there is increasingly a challenge of oversupply of electricity due to the past significant investment in generation capacity and the recent shifts in structure of its economy.[xxi]

While in other countries of the region there remains electricity demand to be met in both urban and rural areas, a second question is whether there are nowadays better ways to meet this remaining demand. The current approach to meeting demand remains predominantly new supply generated by large-scale coal-fired and gas-fired power stations, or large hydropower dams. There are, however, a growing number of initiatives towards decentralized renewable electricity, energy efficiency and demand side management that are disrupting business-as-usual. These include, for example, technologies such as ‘block chain solar power’ and decentralized smart grids or microgrids, new practices such as ‘energy service companies,’ and new modes of financing.[xxii]

A third important question is how climate change will affect the operation of hydropower. The Mekong River Commission (MRC), in a recent report, suggest that under wetter climate scenarios, there would be a greater potential for hydropower generation.[xxiii] At the same time, they flag that the issue of spillway design and dam safety, which could place downstream areas at risk, still requires further assessment. This is a salient challenge in the Mekong Region, given the recent Xe Pian Xe Namnoi dam collapse in July 2018, which displaced over 6,600 people and, according to official figures left 40 people dead and 31 people missing.[xxiv] Meanwhile, extreme dry periods could reduce the dependable generation capacity of hydropower, which would require additional investment for back-up capacity; one option suggested by the MRC is floating solar PV on the reservoir surface, although this would effectively increase the cost of hydropower.

A fourth important question in the context of climate change is whether large dams might mitigate extreme flood and drought. Regarding the hydropower projects on the Lancang River[xxv] in China, in recent years there have been some ‘emergency water releases’ intended to mitigate drought.  In March 2016, for example, shortly before the region’s leaders committed to the Lancang Mekong Cooperation framework, China released water from the Lancang dams stated as a show of goodwill in an effort to alleviate the severe drought in the Lower Mekong basin at that time, although unfortunately the water releases caught some downstream communities unaware.[xxvi]

Yet, the opposite has also occurred, namely that dam operation has exacerbated drought. During the last drought (in July 2019) and the current one[xxvii], operation of the Jinghong Dam – the lowest in China’s Lancang cascade - has on occasion led to significant reductions in river water flow and abnormal fluctuations. Flow reductions were claimed to be necessary due to maintenance at the project. The MRC reported that water levels dropped on the river by up to one meter in Thailand and Laos from 27 December 2019 to 4 January 2020.[xxviii] As agreed by Memorandum of Understanding[xxix], China had sent notification via the MRC on 31 December, which stated water outflows would drop by 50 percent affecting river water levels in Thailand, Lao PDR and Cambodia[xxx]. However, these notifications often arrive to the MRC with little time to spare, and the system to disseminate the information amongst communities is still ineffective.

Acknowledging the impacts on livelihoods, the Thai Government recently publicly stated it would raise the severe impact of the drought within the MRC, including in the context of the upstream dam operation that is received with insufficient notice. This could be read as a significant rebuke given that downstream countries are typically cautious in their regional diplomacy towards China.[xxxi] Indeed, there may be a broader shifting of position, given that Thailand recently also cancelled long-standing joint plans with China for rapid’s blasting of the river’s upper stretch intended to facilitate the navigation by large trading boats.[xxxii] 

Regarding tributary hydropower projects in Laos, there is less available analysis. The MRC, however, has flagged that as most large projects being constructed are under Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts, they are locked into take-or-pay electricity contracts. As such, their potential to be operated as multi-purpose projects that could contribute to extreme flood or drought mitigation could be limited as electricity production is to be prioritized.[xxxiii]

Responses by regional institutions

The Mekong River Commission (MRC) is an intergovernmental river basin commission established by international treaty in 1995.[xxxiv] Climate change has become an increasingly significant element of its work that cumulated with the publication of a Mekong Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan (MASAP) in November 2017.[xxxv] In its State of the Basin Report 2018 (published in late 2019), the impacts of climate change are one of five critical dimensions that constitute its basin monitoring framework.[xxxvi] Various other studies have also been published relevant to climate change adaptation, including on flooding[xxxvii], the impacts of climate change on hydropower production (mentioned above) [xxxviii], and a drought management strategy published in November 2019.[xxxix] The MRC also gathers data on river flow, water quality and sediment transport that are important for understanding climate change.

Whilst these assessments and regional plans contain important analysis, and the MRC’s role is to facilitate a regional plan for adaptation to climate change, various long-standing challenges for the MRC remain. These include its ability to influence national plans, its accountability to communities and civil society, and its relationship with China that is a dialogue partner rather than full member state.

In March 2016, the region’s leaders launched the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) in Sanya City of Hainan Province, China. Two years later, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, a Five-Year Plan of Action on Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (2018-2022) was announced that signified the deepening institutionalization of the LMC. Regarding water resources, it includes commitments to inter-governmental cooperation and its institutionalization, as well as technical cooperation and joint research including on the impacts of climate change. Whilst the details are not in the public domain, there is a stated acknowledgement of the need to “Deepen Lancang-Mekong river flood and drought disaster emergency management, carry out joint assessment of flood control and drought relief in Mekong basin, and carry out joint study on the early setting up of communication line/channel for sharing information in emergency case of flood and drought in Lancang-Mekong river.” [xl]

The LMC is a new significant intergovernmental cooperation given that it brings together all six countries that share the Lancang-Mekong basin. However, it also raises challenges for transboundary water governance, including on: the extent to which crucial water data is shared; the LMC’s transparency and accountability to civil society and riparian communities; whether LMC plans for the Lancang-Mekong River adequately consider the environmental and social values of the river; and how the LMC intends to cooperate with the MRC.

On the latter point, in December 2019, the MRC Secretariat and the Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Center of the LMC signed a new MoU. Whilst it does not fully resolve underlying tensions in competing mandates and approaches between the two regional organizations, it signals an intent to cooperate on various technical areas including: data and information exchange, basin monitoring, and joint assessment and study.[xli]

A first step will be to “to conduct a joint research on the 2019 drought and low flow situation in the Mekong River basin… to be completed by September 2020.”[xlii] This is clearly a significant study. However, in the context of the past impacts of China’s dam operation on Northern Thailand impacting farmers and fishers it is also likely to be a contentious one. During the 2019 drought, a public dispute broke out between representatives of the Chinese Embassy in Bangkok[xliii] and civil society groups in Northern Thailand[xliv] over the role of China’s dams in the drought.[xlv] Given these already existing tensions a transparent and accountable study would be imperative that is inclusive of community concerns in terms of both process and final publication. [xlvi]

Meeting the challenge of climate change

A healthy Lancang-Mekong River is central to maintaining livelihoods, but the river is under stress due to existing challenges in the basin that are increasingly intersecting with climate change. The challenges in the basin and the solutions are to-a-degree technical, but are fundamentally a question of national and regional politics including regarding the competing roles, mandates and authorities of the MRC and LMC, as well as the space for decentralized decision-making and local communities voice.

Whilst recently there have been important steps towards improved water data sharing, more remains to be done. In February 2020, a new program of the MRC called the Joint Environmental Monitoring held its inception workshop that is designed to monitor transboundary environmental impacts from the two recently-commissioned mainstream dam projects in Laos.[xlvii] Meanwhile, as detailed above, the MRC and LMC are undertaking a joint study that may improve data sharing on China’s Lancang dams, although this is not guaranteed. The major gap in regional data sharing at present is dam operation for tributary projects. If meaningfully implemented, better data sharing would facilitate improved advanced warning for droughts and floods, and more accountable basin planning, but only if there is the political will to act on the data.

There are a range of further steps that should be taken including: the need to assess the risks of existing large dams to modified river conditions due to climate change; to consider how existing hydropower projects’ contracts can be rewritten to become multi-purpose schemes; and to explore alternative future electricity scenarios utilizing technologies other than hydropower.

More fundamentally, there is the opportunity to take a more holistic and transformative approach towards managing severe drought and flood through adopting a basin-wide perspective on nature-based solutions, as discussed by UNESCO in the United Nations World Water Development Report 2018[xlviii], and increasing support for community preparedness and culturally appropriate adaptation. The present emphasis on large infrastructure-led approaches to manage severe droughts and floods is already, as evidenced in practiced, revealing its limitations; indeed a ‘control approach’ towards nature has been increasingly critiqued and more flexible approaches that adapt to nature encouraged.[xlix] In the nature-based approach, UNESCO emphasize conserving or rehabilitating natural ecosystems to enhance the storage, quality and availability of water at scales ranging from the micro- to macro, including, for example, forest and wetlands. Necessarily, within such an approach, local community leadership and wider community involvement is central. Meanwhile, enabling in an inclusive, participatory and culturally appropriate way community preparedness and adaptation strategies is important, including effective provision of emergency relief and supporting alternative ways of making a living during periods of severe drought.

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[i] Director, Center of Excellence in Resource Politics for Social Development, Center for Social Development Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. Email: Carl.Chulalongkorn@gmail.com

[ii] MRC (2019) “Mekong water levels reach low record” 18 July 2019 http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mekong-water-levels-reach-low-record/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[iii] MRC (2019) “Drought continues to hit Mekong countries, risking stress on crop production, water shortages” 19 Nov 2019 http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/drought-continues-to-hit-mekong-countries-risking-stress-on-crop-production-water-shortage/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[iv] Lovgren, S. (2020) “Southeast Asia’s most critical river is entering uncharted waters” 31 Jan 2020 https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/01/southeast-asia-most-critical-river-enters-uncharted-waters/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[v] e.g see Evers, J. and A. Pathirana (2018). "Adaptation to climate change in the Mekong River Basin: introduction to the special issue." Climatic Change 149(1): 1-11.

[vi] WLE Greater Mekong (n.d.) “Mekong Dams Observatory” https://wle-mekong.cgiar.org/changes/our-research/greater-mekong-dams-observatory/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]; Middleton, C. and J. Allouche (2016). "Watershed or Powershed?: A critical hydropolitics of the ‘Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Framework." The International Spectator 51(3): 100-117.

[vii] UN-Water (n.d.) “Water and Climate Change” https://www.unwater.org/water-facts/climate-change/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[viii] MRC (n.d.) “Climate Change” http://www.mrcmekong.org/topics/climate-change/ [Last accessed 11.2.20] and MRC (2019) “State of the Basin Report 2018”

[ix] MRC (2019) “Mekong water related resources need urgent protection, better planning and management, says a new MRC report” 22 Oct 2019 http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mekong-water-related-resources-need-urgent-protection-better-planning-and-management-says-a-new-mrc-report/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[x] WWF (n.d.) “Climate Change” http://greatermekong.panda.org/challenges_in_the_greater_mekong/climate_change_in_the_greater_mekong/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xi] MRC (2019) “The Council Study: Study on Sustainable Management and Development of the Mekong River including Impacts of Mainstream Hydropower Projects” http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/Council-Study/Key-findings-of-the-Council-Study_26-Nov-18_Revised-4-Jan-19.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]  

[xii] McSweeny, R. (2016) “Shifting tropical cyclones increases threat to sinking Mekong delta” https://www.carbonbrief.org/shifting-tropical-cyclones-increases-threat-to-sinking-mekong-delta [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020] and Darby, S. E. et al. (2016) Fluvial sediment supply to a mega-delta reduced by shifting tropical-cyclone activity, Nature, doi:10.1038/nature19809

[xiii] Fawthrop, T. (2019) “Dams and climate change are killing the Mekong River” 28 Nov 2019

https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/dams-and-climate-change-are-killing-mekong-river [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xiv] Warner, K., et al (2009) “In search of Shelter: Mapping the effects of climate change on human migration and displacement.” A policy paper prepared for the 2009 Climate Negotiations. Bonn, Germany: United Nations University, CARE, and CIESIN, Columbia University and in close collaboration with the European Commission “Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project”, the UNHCR, and the World Bank.

[xv] Dun, O. (2011). "Migration and Displacement Triggered by Floods in the Mekong Delta." International Migration 49(S1): 200-222; and Chapman, A. and Tri, V.P.D. (2018) “How climate change is triggering a migrant crisis in Vietnam” 25 Jan 2018 https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change-vietnam-migration-crisis-poverty-global-warming-mekong-delta-a8153626.html [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xvi] See IHA (n.d.) “Greenhouse gas emissions” https://www.hydropower.org/greenhouse-gas-emissions [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xvii] Räsänen, T.A. et al (2018) "Greenhouse gas emissions of hydropower in the Mekong River Basin" Environ. Res. Lett. 13 034030 https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aaa817

[xviii] EPPO (n.d.) Electricity statistics http://www.eppo.go.th/index.php/en/en-energystatistics/electricity-statistic?orders[publishUp]=publishUp&issearch=1 [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xix] EGAT (n.d.) “System Installed Generating Capacity: Jan 2020” https://www.egat.co.th/en/information/statistical-data?view=article&layout=edit&id=80 [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xx] EPPO (2016) Power Purchased from Laos PDR (posted on 29 March 2016) http://www.eppo.go.th/index.php/en/energy-information-services/power-purchased-from-laos-pdr; and EGAT (2020) “System Installed Generating Capacity” (as of January 2020). https://www.egat.co.th/en/information/statistical-data?view=article&id=80 [Last accessed 9 March 2020]

[xxi] Magee, D. and Hennig, T. (2017) “Hydropower boom in China and along Asia’s rivers outpaces regional electricity demand” 28 April 2017. https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2017/04/28/hydropower-boom-in-china-and-along-asias-rivers-outpaces-regional-electricity-demand/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxii] Hong, C-S. (2019) “Thailand’s Renewable Energy Transitions: A Pathway to Realize Thailand 4.0” 9 March 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/thailands-renewable-energy-transitions-a-pathway-to-realize-thailand-4-0/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020] and UNESCAP (2018) Energy Transition Pathways for 2030 Agenda for Asia and the Pacific: Regional Trends Report on Energy for Sustainable Development 2018

[xxiii] MRC (2018) “Basin-Wide Assessment of Climate Change Impacts on Hydropower Production” http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/Basin-wide-Assessment-of-Climate-Change-Impacts-on-Hydropower-Production_report-13May19.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxiv] RFA (2019) “Laos Pays Compensation to Families of Dead and Missing in PNPC Dam Disaster” 29 Jan 2019. https://reliefweb.int/report/lao-peoples-democratic-republic/laos-pays-compensation-families-dead-and-missing-pnpc-dam [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxv] The Lancang River is the name in China of the upper stretch of the Mekong River

[xxvi] Middleton, C. and J. Allouche (2016). "Watershed or Powershed?: A critical hydropolitics of the ‘Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Framework." The International Spectator 51(3): 100-117.

[xxvii] MRC (2019) “Mekong water levels to drop due to dam equipment testing in China” 31 Dec 2019 http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mekong-water-levels-to-drop-due-to-dam-equipment-testing-in-china/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxviii] MRC (2020) “Weekly Dry Season Situation Report for the Mekong River Basin Prepared on: 07/01/2020, covering the week from 31 Dec 2019 to 5 Jan 2020” https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2020-01-06%20Weekly%20Dry%20Season%20Situation.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxix] MRC (2019) “MRC and China renew pact on water data provision and other cooperation initiatives” http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mrc-and-china-renew-pact-on-water-data-provision-and-other-cooperation-initiatives/ [Last accessed 9 March 2020]

[xxx]  MRC (2019) “Mekong water levels to drop due to dam equipment testing in China” 31 Dec 2019 http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mekong-water-levels-to-drop-due-to-dam-equipment-testing-in-china/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxxi] Sivasomboon, B. and Phaicharoen, N. (2020) “Thailand to Air Concerns with River Commission over Drought, Chinese Dams in Mekong” https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/thai/thailand-china-01142020183829.html [Last accessed on 23 Feb 2020]

[xxxii] Zhou, L. (2020) “Thailand nixed China’s Mekong River blasting project. Will others push back?” https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3051812/thailand-nixed-chinas-mekong-river-blasting-project-will [Last accessed 9 March 2020]

[xxxiii] Kijewski, L. (2019) “Experts doubt effectiveness of new plan to address Mekong drought” 26 Dec 2019 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/experts-doubt-effectiveness-plan-address-mekong-drought-191225010811086.html/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxxiv] MRC (1995). Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, 5 April 1995 http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/policies/agreement-Apr95.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxxv] MRC (2017) “Mekong Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan” http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/MASAP-book-28-Aug18.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxxvi] MRC (2019) “State of the Basin Report 2018” http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/SOBR-v8_Final-for-web.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxxvii] MRC (2019) “Enhancement of Basin-wide Flood Analysis and Additional Simulations under Climate Change for Impact Assessment and MASAP Preparation” http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/Enhancement-of-Basin-wide-Flood-Analysis-27June19.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]                                                  

[xxxviii] MRC (2018) “Basin-Wide Assessment of Climate Change Impacts on Hydropower Production” http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/Basin-wide-Assessment-of-Climate-Change-Impacts-on-Hydropower-Production_report-13May19.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xxxix] MRC (2019) “Drought Management Strategy for the Lower Mekong Basin 2020-2025” http://www.mrcmekong.org/assets/Publications/MRC-DMS-2020-2025-Fourth-draft-V3.0-formatted.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xl] LMC (2018) “Five-Year Plan of Action on Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (2018-2022)” https://pressocm.gov.kh/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ENG-Five-Year-Plan-of-Action-on-Lancang-Mekong-Cooperation-2018-2022.pdf [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xli] MRC (2019) “MRC Secretariat, LMC Water Center ink first MOU for better upper-lower Mekong management” 18 Dec 2019 http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mrc-secretariat-lmc-water-center-ink-first-mou-for-better-upper-lower-mekong-management/  [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xlii] MRC (2019) “Mekong water levels to drop due to dam equipment testing in China” 31 Dec 2019 http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mekong-water-levels-to-drop-due-to-dam-equipment-testing-in-china/ [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xliii] Yang Yang “False report undermines Mekong cooperation” Bangkok Post 12.7.19 https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1711051/false-report-undermines-mekong-cooperation [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xliv] Roykaew, N. (2019) “Opinion: China must be sincere on the Mekong” 17 July 2019 Bangkok Post https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1713756/china-must-be-sincere-on-mekong [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xlv] Sunchindah, A. “Mekong dilemmas need political will to resolve” 26.7.19 https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1719067/mekong-dilemmas-need-political-will-to-resolve [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xlvi] Bainbridge, A. (2020) “China's Mekong River dams are generating renewable energy, but are costing locals their livelihoods” 20 Jan 2020 https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-01-20/china-mekong-river-plan-creates-renewable-energy-but-costs-jobs/11872640 [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]; Wongcha-um, P. “Missing Mekong waters rouse suspicions of China” Reuters 25.7.19 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mekong-river/missing-mekong-waters-rouse-suspicions-of-china-idUSKCN1UK19Q?fbclid=IwAR2cMyWj9qSwVRAs7lABnzI7oaD1oCvyjD5TSDcDkWf3CJwDqcU46GY7lUs [Last accessed 23 Feb 2020]

[xlvii] MRC (2020) “Pilot program to monitor impacts from Xayaburi and Don Sahong takes off” http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/pilot-program-to-monitor-impacts-from-xayaburi-and-don-sahong-takes-off/ [Last accessed 9 March 2020]

[xlviii] UNESCO (2018) “Nature Based Solutions for Water: The United Nations World Water Development Report 2018”

[xlix] Allouche, J., Middleton C. and Gyawali, D. (2019). The Water-Food-Energy Nexus: Power, Politics and Justice Routledge-Earthscan: London and New York

JOURNAL ARTICLE: Ontological Politics of Hydrosocial Territories in the Salween River Basin, Myanmar/Burma

Publication date: April 2020

Publication: Political Geography, Volume 78

Authors: Johanna M. Götz, Carl Middleton

Abstract:

In this paper, we question an often-unchallenged assumption that we all talk about the same ‘thing’ when talking about water. Taking the Salween River in Myanmar as a case study, we draw on a growing body of hydrosocial literature to analyze the multiple ontologies of water. Conceptually, we take each ontology to be constituted of – and enacted within – a human-more-than-human assemblage, the spatiotemporal dimensions of which demarcate a ‘hydrosocial territory.’ We present three illustrations, namely: the role of the Union Government's National Water Resources Committee and how it manifests and is situated within an ontology of ‘modern Water’; a Karen indigenous initiative to establish a Salween Peace Park and an associated revealing of an ‘indigenous’ ontology; and plans for the construction of mainstream hydropower dams and electricity export to neighboring Thailand, where different water ontologies and their hydrosocial territories collide. We examine how multiple ontologies of water are contested through ‘ontological politics’, whereby human actors compete to further their own interests by naturalizing their ontology while marginalizing others. While not downplaying the role violent conflict plays, we argue that in the Salween basin ontological politics are an underappreciated terrain of contestation through which political authority and the power relations that underpin it are (re)produced, with implications for processes of state formation, territorialization and the ongoing peace negotiations.

Key Words: Salween/Thanlwin River, Resource politics, Multiple ontologies of water, Partially-connected worlds

Read the article here.

Citation: Götz, J. M., & Middleton, C. (2020). Ontological politics of hydrosocial territories in the Salween River basin, Myanmar/Burma. Political Geography, 78, 102115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102115

BOOK CHAPTER: A State of Knowledge of the Salween River: An Overview of Civil Society Research

Publication date:
August 2019

Publication:
Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River

Chapter Title:
A State of Knowledge of the Salween River: An Overview of Civil Society Research

Authors:
Vanessa Lamb, Carl Middleton, Saw John Bright, Saw Tha Phoe, Naw Aye Aye Myaing, Nang Hom Kham, Sai Aum Khay, Nang Sam Paung Hom, Nang Aye Tin, Nang Shining, Yu Xiaogang, Chen Xiangxue, Chayan Vaddhanaphuti

Editors:
Carl Middleton and Vanessa Lamb

You can access the chapter here.

For further details on the book and to purchase, please visit Springer.

For more information about our project Salween Water Governance, please visit here.

This chapter presents an overview of civil society research on Salween, providing an overview of the existing knowledge of the basin and a start to identifying key knowledge gaps in support of more informed, inclusive, and accountable water governance in the basin.

Please contact Dr. Carl Middleton for more information.

Citation: Lamb, V., Middleton, C., Saw John Bright, Saw Tha Phoe, Naw Aye Aye Myaing, Nang Hom Kham, Sai Aum Khay, Nang Sam Paung Hom, Nang Aye Tin, Nang Shining, Yu, X., Chen, X. and Vaddhanaphuti, C. (2019) “A State of Knowledge of the Salween River: An Overview of Civil Society Research” (pp 107-120) in Middleton, C. and Lamb, V. (eds.) Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

BOOK CHAPTER: From Hydropower Construction to National Park Creation: Changing Pathways of the Nu River

Publication date:
August 2019

Publication:
Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River

Chapter Title:
From Hydropower Construction to National Park Creation: Changing Pathways of the Nu River

Authors:
Yu Xiaogang, Chen Xiangxue, Carl Middleton

Editors:
Carl Middleton and Vanessa Lamb

You can access the chapter here.

For further details on the book and to purchase, please visit Springer.

For more information about our project Salween Water Governance, please visit here.

This chapter explores the range of visions for the Nu River and the extent to which they have materialized through exploring five ‘pathways’, namely: The hydropower construction pathway; the civil society river protection pathway; the energy reform pathway; the national park pathway; and the water conservancy pathway.

Please contact Dr. Carl Middleton for more information.

Citation: Yu, X., Chen, X., and Middleton, C. (2019) “From Hydropower Construction to National Park Creation: Changing Pathways of the Nu River” (pp 49-70) in Middleton, C. and Lamb, V. (eds.) Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River. Cham, Switzerland: Springer

BOOK CHAPTER: Hydropower Politics and Conflict on the Salween River

Publication date:
August 2019

Publication:
Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River

Chapter Title:
Hydropower Politics and Conflict on the Salween River

Authors:
Carl Middleton, Alec Scott and Vanessa Lamb

Editors:
Carl Middleton and Vanessa Lamb

You can access the chapter here.

For further details on the book and to purchase, please visit Springer.

For more information about our project Salween Water Governance, please visit here.

This chapter examines the hydropower politics of the Salween River, with a focus on the projects proposed in Myanmar and their connections with neighboring China and Thailand via electricity trade, investment, and regional geopolitics.

Please contact Dr. Carl Middleton for more information.

Citation: Middleton, C., Scott, A. and Lamb, V. (2019) “Chapter 3: Hydropower Politics and Conflict on the Salween River” (pp 27-48) in Middleton, C. and Lamb, V. (eds.) Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River. Cham, Switzerland: Springer

BOOK CHAPTER: Introduction: Resources Politics and Knowing the Salween River

Publication date:
August 2019

Publication:
Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River

Chapter Title:
Introduction: Resources Politics and Knowing the Salween River

Authors:
Vanessa Lamb, Carl Middleton, and Saw Win

Editors:
Carl Middleton and Vanessa Lamb

You can access the chapter here.

For further details on the book and to purchase, please visit Springer.

For more information about our project Salween Water Governance, please visit here.

This chapter provides an overview of key arguments and concepts of the edited volume across three themes: resource politics, politics of making knowledge, and reconciling knowledge across divides.

Please contact Dr. Carl Middleton for more information.

Citation: Lamb, V., Middleton, C. and Saw Win (2019) “Introduction: Resources Politics and Knowing the Salween River” (pp 1-16) in Middleton, C. and Lamb, V. (eds.) Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River. Cham, Switzerland: Springer

BOOK: Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River

Title:
Knowing the Salween River: Resource Politics of a Contested Transboundary River

Editors:
Carl Middleton and Vanessa Lamb

Year:
2019

Further details about the book are available here.

This open access book focuses on the Salween River, shared by China, Myanmar, and Thailand, that is increasingly at the heart of pressing regional development debates. The basin supports the livelihoods of over 10 million people, and within it there is great socio-economic, cultural and political diversity. The basin is witnessing intensifying dynamics of resource extraction, alongside large dam construction, conservation and development intervention, that is unfolding within a complex terrain of local, national and transnational governance. With a focus on the contested politics of water and associated resources in the Salween basin, this book offers a collection of empirical case studies that highlights local knowledge and perspectives. Given the paucity of grounded social science studies in this contested basin, this book provides conceptual insights at the intersection of resource governance, development, and politics of knowledge relevant to researchers, policy-makers and practitioners at a time when rapid change is underway.

For more information about our project Salween Water Governance, please visit here.

POLICY BRIEF: Shaping the Future of Mekong Regional Architecture: Reinforcing Transboundary Water Governance Through Reciprocity

Publication date:
June 2019

Publication: 
Shaping the Future of Mekong Regional Architecture: Reinforcing Transboundary Water Governance Through Reciprocity

Download the policy brief here.

This policy brief is produced for track 1.5 Mekong Policy Dialogue on evolving sub-regional architecture and the role of Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), co-organized by Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade - Australia (DFAT), The Asia Foundation (TAF), and Center for Social Development Studies (CSDS) . For more information more resources from the dialogue, please visit this link here.

Authors: 
Carl Middleton, David J. Devlaeminck, and Anisa Widyasari

Key Findings

• There is deepening cooperation between the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and Lancang Mekong Cooperation (LMC). The joint activities to date can be understood as examples of specific reciprocity, namely specific exchanges of more-or-less equal value with clearly defined obligations, and have helped build trust.

• To further collaboration, regional governments will need to gradually move from specific reciprocity to diffuse reciprocity. Here, cooperation is not between specific actors alone (i.e. the MRC and LMC), but reflects a broader cooperation between wider groups of actors and beyond river-based considerations.

• To date, the MRC has directed more attention to the benefits to the river, including wild capture fisheries and other ecosystem services, whilst the LMC has emphasized more regional economic planning and projects. By working together, the river might be better protected, whilst simultaneously yielding sustainable generation of economic benefits.

• Some potential directions for furthering collaboration include: a joint, systematic baseline assessment of the current ecological and socio-economic status of the Lancang-Mekong River and key drivers of change; a joint study on the existing legal rules, customary principles, and pledges maintained by each organization to identify points of commonality and difference; and a collaborative analysis to define reciprocity as a concept, and how it can be operationalized through relevant rules and regulations working towards a rulesbased approach.

• The concept of reciprocity encompasses not just inter-state cooperation but also the interests and activities of non-state stakeholders, such as riverside communities. The MRC and LMC could consider co-organizing multi-stakeholder dialogues to generate a more complete picture of the Lancang-Mekong River and its diverse economic, social and cultural values.

BOOK CHAPTER: Knowledge Coproduction for Recovering Wetlands, Agro-Ecological Farming, and Livelihoods in the Mekong Region

Publication date:
August 2019

Publication:
Knowledge Co-production for Recovering Wetlands, Agro-ecological Farming and Livelihoods in the Mekong Region

Author:
Carl Middleton, Kanokwan Manorom, Nguyen Van Kien, Outhai Soukkhy and Albert Salamanca

Editors:
Chayanis Krittasudthacheewa, Hap Navy, Bui Duc Tinh, and Saykham Voladet

For further details on the book please visit the book's website here.

You can access the chapter here.

The Mekong Region contains extensive wetlands of high levels of biodiversity that have long provided a wide range of ecosystem services that are equally important to human well-being. In many cases, these wetlands have long been important for agro-ecological production, including rice and vegetable farming, livestock raising, fishing and aquaculture, and the collection of non-timber forest products (NTFPs), thus supporting local livelihoods and economies.

Unfortunately, many wetlands in the Mekong Region have been degraded or even lost, largely due to agricultural intensification, large-scale water infrastructure development, and land use changes associated with urbanization The extensive loss of wetlands is a threat to sustainable economic development through the loss of core ecosystem services that they provide. It also threatens the enjoyment of a range of human rights, including the rights to life, health, food, water and culture. When traditional wetlands agro-ecological practices are lost, so too are the local knowledge and culture associated with them.

Addressing complex problems such as the loss of wetlands requires gathering and activating a range of different types of knowledge, including scientific (expert), local, practical, and political. In this chapter, we present three case studies of knowledge coproduction research in Thailand, Vietnam and Laos aimed at the more inclusive ecological governance of wetlands degraded by largescale water infrastructure and the recovery of associated agro-ecological systems and livelihoods. We consider knowledge coproduction to be the dynamic interaction of multiple actors, each with their own types of knowledge, who coproduce new usable knowledge specific to their environmental, sociopolitical and cultural context and that can influence decision-making and actions on the ground. We argue that the knowledge coproduction approach enables research to move beyond weak forms of “participation” and towards social learning that builds trust, partnership and ownership among actors, and can generate innovative solutions for wetland and livelihood recovery.

Please contact Dr. Carl Middleton for more information.

Citation: Middleton, C., Manorom, K., Nguyen, V.K., Soukkhy, O. and Salamanca, A. (2019) “Knowledge Co-production for Recovering Wetlands, Agro-ecological Farming and Livelihoods in the Mekong Region” (pp 9-34) in Krittasudthacheewa, C., Navy, H., Tinh, B.C. and Voladet, S. (eds). Development and Climate Change in the Mekong Region. SIRD/Gerakbudaya, Malaysia

OPINION: Mekong Drought Reveals Need for Regional Rules-based Water Cooperation

by Carl Middleton

Photo Credit: The Network of Thai People in Eight Mekong Provinces

The severe drought currently faced by farmers and fishers in the Mekong basin is a disaster that reveals many things. It reveals the extent to which large dams now increasingly control river water levels. It reveals too the limits to cooperation between the countries sharing precious water in times of scarcity. And, it reveals the likelihood of an increasingly uncertain future under the conditions of climate change. What must be done in the short and long term?

It is – in theory – now almost the middle of the rainy season. Usually at this time the Mekong River is beginning to swell with the rain waters of the Southwest monsoon. Yet, this year water levels are as if it were a drought in the dry season. This has seriously affected farmers, with their planted rice and other crops withering in parched soil. It has also impacted fishers dependent on the river’s ecology.

In mid-July, the intergovernmental Mekong River Commission (MRC) stated that the river’s water levels are among the lowest on record for June and July. They explain that there has been a shortage of rainfall across the basin since January. The MRC also highlight that dam operation on the upper Mekong River in China, where it is known as the Lancang River, could have an impact. China sent a notification to the MRC indicating that between 5 to 19 July the water released from the lower of its eleven large dams, called Jinghong, would “fluctuate” due to “grid maintenance.”

Photo Credit: The Network of Thai People in Eight Mekong Provinces

This has had a two-fold impact. First, it withheld water at a time when downstream countries would have most benefited from more water being released. Second, sending unnatural pulses of water down the river harms river ecology and livelihoods dependent upon it, including riverbank gardens, river weed collection, and fishing, although this has in fact occurred since the late 1990s.

Alongside China’s dams, civil society groups have questioned the role of the Xayaburi dam in Northern Laos, which is scheduled to be commissioned in October this year. Since mid-July, the project had been testing its turbines, causing river fluctuations downstream. The company has denied that they have played a role in the drought, and ironically have even lamented that they were also affected by the withholding of water by China. However, Thailand’s Office of National Water Resources sent a letter to the Government of Laos requesting the testing be temporarily halted.

Less attention has been paid to the possible role of tributary hydropower dams, in particular in Laos that is progressively fulfilling its government’s vision to become the ‘battery of Southeast Asia.’ Over sixty medium and large-scale dams have been built to date. The question here is whether these tributary projects have also been withholding water to replenish their reservoirs to sell electricity. As with all of the hydropower dams in the Lancang-Mekong basin, little real-time data is in the public domain about reservoir water levels.

What are the lessons learned and what is to be done? Most immediately, support needs to be provided to rural communities both to distribute water to the extent that it is available and provide other means of support including, where necessary, financial support. Once the rains do arrive, as is anticipated any day now, hydropower project operators should resist the temptation to immediately begin replenishing their reservoirs for power generation. Rather, the priority should be with distributing water to farmers and recovering the river’s ecology for fishers and wildlife.

In the longer term, if it is true that there is little water in hydropower dam reservoirs, this also reveals the fallacy of depending too much on such infrastructure-led solutions towards managing drought. Rather, it indicates that other forms of preparedness will be necessary including better predictive capacity for droughts before they occur, and well-resourced plans once they do occur at the local, national and transboundary level. It should also include rethinking water storage to consider more groundwater and small-scale solutions, rather than focusing only on large dams.

Photo Credit: The Network of Thai People in Eight Mekong Provinces

Given that the Mekong River is shared between six countries, it is clear that even deeper inter-governmental cooperation is needed. Since the last severe drought in 2016, much has been said about the new regional cooperation under the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) between China and downstream countries, including how it should cooperate with the MRC. In March 2016, shortly before the region’s leaders committed to the LMC, China released water from the Lancang dams as a show of goodwill in an effort to alleviate the severe drought at that time, although unfortunately the water releases caught some downstream communities unaware.

Building on the collaboration between the MRC and LMC, rather than depend upon informal arrangements for sharing water between China and downstream countries, it would be better to move towards a clearer rules-based approach. The scope of cooperation, some of which has already started, should include: more comprehensive data sharing between governments and with the public; collaborative research; clear rules and procedures on emergency water release; hydropower cascade operation that mimics, to the extent possible, the natural river flow; and improved procedures for genuine public participation, especially for riverside communities.

In the face of worsening climate change, and recognizing that it is often the most vulnerable who face the greatest risk during times of drought, these short and long-term solutions are needed now more than ever.

For the article published in Thai, please visit this link.

Carl Middleton is Director of the Center of Excellence in Resource Politics for Social Development at the Center for Social Development Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. He can be contacted at Carl.Chulalongkorn@gmail.com.

JOURNAL ARTICLE: Hybrid Governance of Transboundary Commons: Insights from Southeast Asia

Publication date:
July 2019

Publication: Annals of the American Association of Geographers

Authors:
Michelle Ann Miller, Carl Middleton, Jonathan Rigg & David Taylor

Abstract:

This article examines how hybrid environmental governance produces, maintains, and reconfigures common property across transboundary geographies of resource access, use, and ownership. Transboundary commons are a category of environmental goods that traverse jurisdictions and property regimes within as well as between nation-states. They are forged through collaborative partnerships between spatially dispersed state, private-sector, and societal institutions and actors. This article disaggregates these transboundary commoning arrangements into two geographically discrete yet conceptually intertwined categories of governance: mobile commons and in situ commons. We ground our enquiry in Southeast Asia, a resource-rich region where diverse formal and informal practices of resource organization blur the boundaries of environmental governance. Whereas environmental commons are often analyzed in terms of resource rights and entitlements, this article argues that a focus on power relations offers a more productive analytical lens through which to understand the dynamic and networked ways in which transboundary common property is continually being (re)made through processes of hybrid governance in response to changing ecological systems and shifting social realities.

Key Words: ASEAN, common property, cross-border governance, environmental commons, hybrid governance.

Read the article here.

Citation: Miller, M. A., Middleton, C., Rigg, J., & Taylor, D. (2020). Hybrid governance of transboundary commons: Insights from Southeast Asia. Annals of the American Association of Geographers, 110(1), 297–313. https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2019.1624148

BOOK: The Water–Food–Energy Nexus: Power, Politics and Justice

Title:
The Water–Food–Energy Nexus: Power, Politics and Justice

Authors:
Jeremy Allouche, Carl Middleton, Dipak Gyawali

Year:
2019

Further details about the book are available here.

Open access copy of Chapter 4 of the book can be accessed here: “The Knowledge Nexus and Transdisciplinarity” 

The world of development thinkers and practitioners is abuzz with a new lexicon: the idea of "the nexus" between water, food, and energy which is intuitively compelling. It promises better integration of multiple sectoral elements, a better transition to greener economies, and sustainable development. However, there appears to be little agreement on its precise meaning, whether it only complements existing environmental governance approaches or how it can be enhanced in national contexts. One current approach to the nexus treats it as a risk and security matter while another treats it within economic rationality addressing externalities across sector. A third perspective acknowledges it as a fundamentally political process requiring negotiation amongst different actors with distinct perceptions, interests, and practices. This perspective highlights the fact that technical solutions for improving coherence within the nexus may have unintended and negative impacts in other policy areas, such as poverty alleviation and education. 　

The Water–Food–Energy Nexus: Power, Politics and Justice lays out the managerial-technical definitions of the nexus and challenges these conceptions by bringing to the forefront the politics of the nexus, around two key dimensions – a dynamic understanding of water–food–energy systems, and a normative positioning around nexus debates, in particular around social justice. The authors argue that a shift in nexus governance is required towards approaches where limits to control are acknowledged, and more reflexive/plural strategies adopted.

This book will be of interest to academic researchers, policy makers, and practitioners in the fields of international development studies, environmental politics, and science and technology studies, as well as international relations.

Citation: Allouche, J., Middleton C. and Gyawali, D. (2019). The Water-Food-Energy Nexus: Power, Politics and Justice. Routledge-Earthscan: London and New York

REPORT: The Environment - Contested Knowledge of the Commons in Southeast Asia (CRISEA Working Paper 1)

Publication date:
March 2019

Publication:
The Environment - Contested Knowledge of the Commons in Southeast Asia (CRISEA Working Paper 1)

Authors:
Tomasz Kamiński, Monika Arnez, Carl Middleton, Sally Beckenham, Robert A. Farnan, David Chu, Edyta Roszko, Amnuayvit Thitibordin, Andrea Valente, Michał Zaręba

Download the report here.

Environmental questions are at the heart of many development dilemmas in Southeast Asia. New actors and technologies, changing domestic politics, policies, and economies - as well as shifting geopolitical contexts, are remaking nature-society relations in the region. A failure to address transnational environmental challenges could not only undermine ASEAN’s legitimacy but also have drastic consequences for the region’s security and its political and economic stability.

In addressing these questions in this Working Paper, we are particularly concerned with contested knowledges of “the commons” and competition over resources. We consider the environment as a driver of processes of regional integration, but also of conflicts between various actors in the region. Our research focuses on three environmental contexts namely: sea; rivers; and air. In addressing all three our emphasis is on the transition to a low-carbon economy. Grounded in a multidisciplinary approach, our research shares a common conceptual framework, centred on the co-production of ecological knowledge and ecological governance.

Drawing on the work of Sheila Jasanoff (2004), Shubhra Gururani and Peter Vandergeest (2014), amongst others, we consider the production, circulation, acquisition and assimilation of ecological knowledge at, and across the local, national and global levels and its relationship to ecological governance. Based on macro and micro case studies, we relate this dynamic process of co-production to other concepts, including reterritorialization; feminist political ecology, hydropolitics, and paradiplomacy (international relations conducted by subnational governments on their own). The aim of this paper is to present the theoretical framework of our work as well as the three main strands of our research. In the first section, we explain our understanding of the concept of ecological knowledge. This is followed by a presentation of our methodological approaches, while the last section presents the individual research projects in the WP, arranged in three modules.

Please contact Dr. Carl Middleton for more information.

Citation: Kamiński, T., Arnez, M., Middleton, C., Beckenham, S., Farnan, R.A., Chu, D., Roszko, E., Thitibordin, A., Valente, A., and Zaręba, M. (2019) The Environment - Contested Knowledge of the Commons in Southeast Asia (CRISEA Working Paper 1). Competing Regional Integrations in Southeast Asia (CRISEA) Working Paper No. 1 (March 2019).

This report is part of our project The Contested Meanings of the Mekong River in Northern Thailand. You can visit the project page here.

OPINION: What does Chinese ‘Reciprocity’ mean for Mekong’s Dams?

by Carl Middleton

The Lancang Mekong supports 70 million people living in the basin（Photo: He Daming)

It is now two and a half years since the first Lancang Mekong Cooperation (LMC) leaders’ summit was held in Sanya city on Hainan Island, China. The aim of the LMC – a China led multilateral body involving all six Mekong countries – is to deepen economic, cultural and political ties between China and mainland Southeast Asia. Leaders have repeatedly declared the importance of the Lancang-Mekong River to this cooperation. Reflecting this, on 1-2 November, the LMC will host the “1st Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Forum” in Kunming, China.

The LMC’s second leaders’ summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in January 2018 revealed the swift pace of the initiative. This is reflected in the numerous senior-level meetings between governments, the initiation of almost 200 China-funded projects, and the LMC’s deepening institutionalisation through various LMC secretariats and working groups. Yet, while China has hosted people-to-people exchange programs and university scholarships, the LMC’s state-centric approach has afforded little opportunity for public deliberation about its overall policy principles and direction.

Through the LMC, some government officials and scholars from China have proposed that downstream and upstream countries have both rights and responsibilities towards each other. This concept of ‘reciprocity’ is not yet official LMC policy, but suggests a shift in government position compared to China’s earlier unilateral construction of dams on the Lancang River. Overall, the LMC and its proposition of ‘reciprocity’ appears to be an invitation to negotiate basin-wide water cooperation on the Lancang-Mekong River.

Much, however, remains uncertain. For example, how will the LMC build upon the existing inter-governmental Mekong River Commission, established in 1995 by the four lower basin countries? How will the LMC address concerns of riverside communities and civil society and ensure their meaningful inclusion? And how will countries ensure the river’s ecological health given the strong push for economic growth and associated water infrastructure projects? This article asks whether the LMC and the concept of ‘reciprocity’ is a promising approach to meet these challenges.

For the full article, please click here.

POLICY BRIEF: Reciprocal Transboundary Cooperation on the Lancang-Mekong River: Towards an Inclusive and Ecological Relationship

Publication date:
November 2018

Publication: 
Reciprocal Transboundary Cooperation on the Lancang-Mekong River: Towards an Inclusive and Ecological Relationship

Download the policy brief here.

Visit the Water governance and knowledge production on the Lancang-Mekong River project page here.

Author: 
Carl Middleton
 

Summary
It is now two and a half years since the first Lancang Mekong Cooperation (LMC) leaders’ summit was held in Sanya city in Yunnan Province, China. During this period, the LMC has become increasingly institutionalized. The overarching ambition of the LMC is to deepen economic, cultural and political ties between China and mainland Southeast Asia. This policy brief assesses emerging principles for transboundary water cooperation under the LMC, in particular the concept of reciprocity that expands upon the UN Water Courses Convention. It also assesses the role of the LMC vis-a-vis the Mekong River Commission in transboundary water governance. The analysis concludes that as the LMC becomes a more consolidated institution, a genuine and equal partnership for the Lancang-Mekong River cooperation is needed that could build upon principles of “inclusive reciprocity” between state and non-state actors, and “ecological reciprocity” that recognizes the need for an ecologically healthy Lancang-Mekong River.

Mekong River at Chiang Khong, Northern Thailand (Credit: Carl Middleton)

JOURNAL ARTICLE: National Human Rights Institutions, Extraterritorial Obligations and Hydropower in Southeast Asia: Implications of the Region’s Authoritarian Turn

Publication date:
June 2018

Publication: Austrian Journal of Southeast Asia Studies

Authors:
Carl Middleton

This article examines the role of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and transnational civil society in pursing Extraterritorial Obligation (ETO) cases in Southeast Asia as a means to investigate human rights threatened by cross-border investment projects. Two large hydropower dams under construction in Laos submitted to NHRIs from Thailand and Malaysia, namely the Xayaburi Dam and Don Sahong Dam, are detailed as case studies. The article argues that the emergence of ETOs in Southeast Asia, and its future potential, is dependent upon the collaborative relationship between the NHRIs and transnational civil society networks. Whilst NHRIs are in positions of political authority to investigate cases, civil society also enable cases through networking, research, and public advocacy. Further institutionalization of ETOs is significant to emerging regional and global agendas on business and human rights, including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights that both the Thai and Malaysian governments have expressed commitment to. However, in Thailand and its neighboring countries where investments are located there has been an authoritarian turn. Reflecting this, there are weakening mandates of NHRIs and reduced civil and political freedoms upon which civil society depends that challenges the ability to investigate and pursue cases.

Read the article here.

citation: Middleton, C. (2018). National human rights institutions, extraterritorial obligations, and hydropower in Southeast Asia: Implications of the region’s authoritarian turn. Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 11(1), 81–97. https://doi.org/10.14764/10.ASEAS-2018.1-5

BOOK CHAPTER: Branding Dams: Nam Theun 2 and its Role in Producing the Discourse of “Sustainable Hydropower”

Publication date:
June 2018

Publication:
Dead in the Water: Global Lessons from the World Bank's Model Hydropower Project in Laos

Author:
Carl Middleton

Editors: Bruce Shoemaker and William Robichaud

For further details on the book please visit the book's website here.

In the 1990s, the global hydropower industry – in particular the industry of Northern countries – was facing a growing crisis of legitimacy. Opponents of large dams grew in numbers and became increasingly vocal, claiming that development benefits were exaggerated. This cumulated in the publication of the World Commission on Dams (WCD) report in 2000, which affirmed many of the opponents’ criticisms.   In this context, the World Bank, seeking a means to once again finance large hydropower, put forward the Nam Theun 2 (NT2) hydropower project as a new, best-practice approach.  Meanwhile, the International Hydropower Association (IHA) sought to counter the WCD with its own sustainability guidelines in 2004 and subsequently a Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol (HSAP) launched in 2011. From this significant and combined effort of large am proponents emerged the policy discourse of “sustainable hydropower,” the purpose of which was to re-legitimize the industry.

This chapter deconstructs how NT2 has been discursively produced as a “brand” and woven in to the “sustainable hydropower” discourse. The chapter argues that in public the World Bank and the hydropower industry have regularly drawn on the NT2 as a model to legitimize their claim that “sustainable hydropower” can exist. Needless to say, this claim is fiercely disputed. Indeed, behind closed doors amongst the project’s proponents and in specialist hydropower industry conferences, more provisos and nuances are considered that bracket the public claims of success. The chapter also addresses how NT2 has been represented in regional and global debates on “sustainable hydropower,” for example in relation to the Hydropower Sustainabilty Assessment Protocol led by the International Hydropower Association. 

Please contact Dr. Carl Middleton for more information.

Citation: Middleton, C. (2018) "Chapter 13: Branding Dams: Nam Theun 2 and its Role in Producing the Discourse of 'Sustainable Hydropower'" (pp 271-292) in Shoemaker, B. and Robichaud, W. (eds.) Dead in the Water: Global Lessons from the World Bank's Model Hydropower Project in Laos. University of Wisconsin Press: Madison.