Riverbank City faces a dilemma. There are contested visions for development in the city and surrounding area.

One proposal is for a “Regional Rice Hub” that entails the construction of a large dam nearby to the city to supply water for large scale irrigation and for electricity generation for rice mill operation. This vision is backed by large-scale rice farmers and rice mill owners, as well as the construction company involved in the dam. There is also a perception in the City that the electricity supply is becoming inadequate, and the large dam would solve this problem.

Other stakeholders, however, currently practice a range of livelihoods including small-scale farming, small-scale fishing, and local tourism. These stakeholders make up the majority of the residents in the city and surrounding area. They are worried about the impact of the Regional Rice Hub plan on their livelihoods, as well as the environmental and cultural impacts.

Meanwhile, the Governor of Riverbank City is facing an election next year. The Governor is being pressured by the national government for further economic growth, and is also answerable to all the stakeholders within Riverbank City.   

As a trusted advisor to the Governor, with good relationships with all stakeholders involved, can you help find a solution?

In this role play game, there are a range of possible outcomes depending upon the decisions taken along the way. At each step you are provided some details about the evolving situation and asked to provide advice to the Governor. This game takes approximately 10 minutes to play.

In the game, you will learn about how different types of “reciprocity” between the stakeholders leads to different water governance and development outcomes. Reciprocity in water governance is a research focus of CSDS, where there are different types of reciprocity:

  • Positive reciprocity, in which actions are collaborative between stakeholders that generate mutual or collective benefits

  • Negative reciprocity, in which actions are ‘tit-for-tat’ that generate mutual harm or ‘winner takes all’ benefits

  • Specific reciprocity, in which there are limited exchanges between stakeholders based on specific and measurable actions

  • Diffuse reciprocity, in which there are wide-ranging exchanges between stakeholders based on numerous actions

  • Exclusive reciprocity, in which there are a limited range of elite stakeholders involved in acts of reciprocity, and high barriers to wider participation of other stakeholders

  • Inclusive reciprocity, in which a wide range of stakeholders are involved in acts of reciprocity, with few barriers to participation

We can consider the outcomes in various ways, including:

  • The sustainability of the outcomes in terms of economic, social and environmental harms and benefits

  • The amount of time that it took to arrive at the final decision

  • The distribution of benefits and harms between different stakeholders, and if they consider them fair or not

  • How the process has built trust or distrust between the various stakeholders involved

For further reading on reciprocity, please see the CSDS Policy Brief “Reciprocal Transboundary Cooperation on the Lancang-Mekong River: Towards an Inclusive and Ecological Relationship” (November 2018) and the journal article “Reciprocity in practice: the hydropolitics of equitable and reasonable utilization in the Lancang-Mekong basin” (October 2020) by Carl Middleton and David J. Devlaeminck.

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Game credit

Created by Thita Orn-in and Carl Middleton (Version 1.1: 10 November 2020)

Disclaimer

In creating this educational game, any similarity to an actually-existing project is purely coincidental.